Washington Law Review
Volume 91

Number 2

6-1-2016

State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern
Administrative State
Shannon M. Roesler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern Administrative State, 91
Wash. L. Rev. 637 (2016).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol91/iss2/17

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

10 - Roesler.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/3/2016 12:49 PM

STATE STANDING TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL
AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE
Shannon M. Roesler*
Abstract: The modern administrative state relies on a model of shared governance.
Federal regulatory regimes addressing a range of economic and social issues depend on the
participation of state governments for their implementation. Although these state-federal
partnerships are often cooperative, conflicts over the allocation of regulatory authority and
administrative policy are inevitable. In recent years, states have sought to resolve some of
these conflicts in the federal courts. Well-known state challenges to federal authority include
challenges to environmental rules, health insurance legislation, and immigration policies. In
these cases, courts have struggled to decide whether states have constitutional standing to
bring suit against the federal government.
This Article fills a gap in the legal scholarship by proposing a “governance” approach to
state standing that would allow states to challenge federal authority when the federal statute
at issue contemplates an implementation role for state governments. The governance
approach finds support both in historical precedent and in modern regulatory reality. The
approach makes state-standing doctrine less susceptible to judicial manipulation and ensures
that courts focus on other threshold questions often obscured by overly broad, incoherent
standing analyses.
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INTRODUCTION
Although political debates often inspire rhetoric couched in “states’
rights,” the reality is that the separate-spheres or dual-sovereignty
conception of federalism no longer accurately describes the relationship
between the states and the federal government. Rather, as the
administrative state has grown to address the complexities of modern
life, governments at all levels—federal, state, and local—have
sometimes collaborated and sometimes competed for regulatory pieces
of various problems. Governmental jurisdiction over many social issues,
including environmental and public health issues, is largely concurrent
and overlapping as states and local governments are charged with the
authority to implement and enforce federal regulations and policies. An
ever-growing number of scholars have recognized this shift in the
jurisdictional landscape and seek to replace old notions of dual
sovereignty with new accounts that capture the overlapping, contingent
nature of federal-state authority.1 Scholars use adjectives, such as

* Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. I would like to thank Robin Kundis
Craig for her thoughtful comments on a previous version of this Article. I would also like to thank
the Oklahoma City University School of Law for supporting my work through the provision of a
summer research grant.
1. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, DeEssentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in FEDERALISM AND
SUBSIDIARITY 363 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H.
Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority,
92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy
Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145 (2007); Heather Gerken,
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory
of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005).
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“interactive,”2 “dynamic,”3 and “polyphonic”4 to capture contemporary
federalism.
The federalism scholarship identifies the potential virtues of
concurrent jurisdiction, noting that it can encourage regulatory
innovation, learning, and experimentation.5 Even so, unproductive
conflicts between states and the federal government can and do arise.6
That is, federal and state regulatory approaches do not always
complement each other, and states and local governments will not
always agree with federal prerogatives. When irreconcilable differences
arise, the federal courts provide a logical forum for their resolution.
Although this may seem obvious, it is under-theorized in the
federalism scholarship7 and is far from settled law. In fact, federal
standing doctrine is notoriously unclear about the extent to which
governments, and in particular the states, have constitutional standing to
litigate questions of governmental authority in federal courts.8 Courts
have grappled with state standing in recent cases on pressing social
2. See generally Buzbee, supra note 1.
3. See generally Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006).
4. See generally ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009).
5. See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 1, at 288–90.
6. Some of these conflicts are reflected in the recent trend of state “opposition statutes” (i.e.,
statutes resisting federal policies). Austin Raynor, The New State Sovereignty Movement, 90 IND.
L.J. 613, 624–34 (2015).
7. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 538 (2011)
(arguing that we do not have “doctrines that attempt to recognize, much less negotiate, the
relationship that is created between state and federal agencies when Congress gives them both
concurrent authority to implement federal law but is ambiguous about how that authority should be
allocated”); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 285 (arguing that we lack “rules of engagement” for
“monitoring federal-state relations” in cooperative governance and arguing “federalism as
polyphony” provides guidance); see also Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Federalism and the
Challenges of State Constitutional Contestation, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 983, 1004–05 (questioning
whether federalism principles support state standing to sue when private litigants would lack
standing).
8. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing Doctrine Notwithstanding, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
189, 190–99 (2015) (examining the “fragmentation” of governmental standing); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061 (2015) (exploring the pros and cons of
standing’s fragmentation, as well as the patterns that have emerged from the Supreme Court’s
opinions over time); Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What Can We Learn When Conservative
Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 558 (2012) (noting the
considerable body of scholarship criticizing standing doctrine); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 263 (6th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER] (describing the Court’s state-standing cases as “hard to
reconcile”).
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issues such as climate change regulation, health insurance reform, and
immigration policy. In Massachusetts v. EPA,9 states challenged the
EPA’s decision not to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
from new motor vehicles.10 In the wake of new federal health insurance
legislation, Virginia and other states sought declaratory judgments that
portions of the new law exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority.11
In 2015, states also challenged federal immigration policies of deferred
action (or prosecution) for some individuals not legally present in the
United States.12 And in late 2015, states filed lawsuits challenging the
EPA’s newly released rules governing the emission of GHGs from
power plants (known as the “Clean Power Plan”).13
Supreme Court precedent identifies three kinds of state interests
sufficient to meet Article III’s case or controversy requirement for suit in
federal court: proprietary interests, sovereignty interests, and quasisovereign interests.14 The first type of interest is analogous to private
common law interests (state property and contracts, for example), which
have long been recognized as legally justiciable.15 Though courts may
grapple with whether a state has alleged a sufficient injury (one that is
actual, concrete, and direct), proprietary injuries resemble injuries in
suits between private parties and do not therefore raise questions unique
to suits by states and local governments. The doctrinal puzzles grow
instead out of decisions regarding the other two categories: sovereignty
and quasi-sovereign interests.
This is not surprising given that state sovereignty (and therefore
9. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
10. Id.
11. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Att’y
Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), rev’d in part sub
nom. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
12. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.
2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). After the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
preliminary injunction of the federal policy, the Supreme Court granted the federal government’s
petition for a writ of certiorari and will likely issue a decision in June 2016. Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134, 162 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016).
13. See Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/02/22/document_ew_02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68PV-LUVY]. After the D.C. Circuit denied the petitioners’ requests for a stay of
the Clean Power Plan, the petitioners applied for a stay in the Supreme Court. Over the dissent of
four justices, the Court stayed the Clean Power Plan pending disposition of the appellate court’s
review and resolution of any review by the Court itself. Order Granting Stay, West Virginia v. EPA,
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
14. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–05 (1982).
15. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (describing the “traditional common-law cause
of action” as “at the conceptual core of the case-or-controversy requirement”).
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quasi-sovereignty) simply cannot mean the same thing today as it did a
century or more ago. Before the advent of the modern administrative
state, federal law was less pervasive and less dependent on the
collaboration of state and local actors for its implementation and
enforcement. It makes little sense to look to early Supreme Court
decisions analyzing federal-state conflicts regarding lawmaking
authority in an age when states and local governments are intimately
involved in the implementation and enforcement of federal law. Because
states and localities must bear sizable social and economic costs when
they agree to participate in federal regulatory schemes, states clearly
have a concrete interest in litigating questions of governmental power
before agreeing to shared governance. Moreover, allowing them to do so
ex ante promotes the efficient resolution of difficult preemption
questions that might otherwise be litigated piecemeal by private parties
alleging various injuries.
Although legal scholars have questioned restrictive doctrines limiting
state access to federal court,16 the literature on constitutional standing
has not adequately addressed when states have Article III standing to
challenge federal authority.17 This Article aims to fill this gap by
conceptualizing injuries to state “governance” interests in a way that is
both consistent with Supreme Court doctrine and grounded in today’s
multijurisdictional regulatory landscape. To be sure, scholars often
dismiss standing doctrine as muddled beyond repair, arguing that judges
manipulate it to reach their preferred ends.18 While tension in the case
law lends support to this claim, it should not silence critical
commentary. In fact, it should inspire commentary because a doctrinally
sound, contemporary theory of state standing should be less susceptible
to judicial manipulation.
The main argument of the Article is that states should have
“governance” standing to challenge federal power and action when the
federal law at issue contemplates an implementation role for state
governments. Congress will sometimes specifically authorize suits by
states and others to facilitate enforcement of regulatory schemes—like
16. See, e.g., Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing
that governments should enjoy implied public rights of action to vindicate states’ administrative and
institutional interests); Heather Elliott, Federalism Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 435, 442–56 (2013)
(discussing the federalism implications of the Court’s decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, __U.S.__,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (holding that proponents of a ballot initiative banning same-sex marriage
lacked standing to defend the initiative)).
17. Most of the recent commentary surrounding state standing is a response to Massachusetts v.
EPA. See sources cited infra note 132.
18. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011).
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the state suit challenging EPA’s decision not to regulate GHG emissions
in Massachusetts v. EPA. But as Massachusetts v. EPA demonstrates,
congressional authorization does not always remove standing concerns
under current doctrine. The approach advocated here would make state
standing in such cases more straightforward by acknowledging that
states have been and should be treated differently for purposes of
standing in certain cases.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I is a historical analysis of
Supreme Court decisions involving issues of sovereignty. The analysis
demonstrates that the Court has long recognized the justiciability of
governance interests. In Part II, close analysis of later and more
contemporary cases, including Massachusetts v. EPA, reveals that much
of today’s confusion regarding state standing can be traced to the
gradual expansion of representative (parens patriae) suits by states suing
on behalf of their citizens. In order to develop a clear doctrinal approach
to state standing in suits against the federal government, we must first
understand how the doctrine regarding representative standing has
clouded the analysis of standing based on governance interests.
Part III lays out a new approach grounded in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, but updated to reflect a “post-sovereignty” state-federal
relationship. The governance approach to state standing allows states to
challenge federal laws and actions when the federal law underlying the
challenge contemplates an implementation role for state governments. In
the modern administrative state, a “sovereign” state government does not
regulate apart from the federal government in most arenas, but
constitutional sovereignty nevertheless guarantees that a state can and
should be accountable to its citizens in how it governs. Because states
often govern with the federal government under federal administrative
laws, they have concrete governance interests that flow from this
modern-day shared sovereignty. They suffer injury to these interests
when the federal government fails to govern or act according to federal
law.
Part III explains how a governance approach to state suits challenging
federal authority would provide federal courts with a clear, coherent
approach to state standing—making the doctrine less susceptible to
manipulation. Instead of analyzing state standing under both the
traditional injury-in-fact test and the unclear “special solicitude” test that
Massachusetts v. EPA arguably creates, the governance approach would
combine the two inquiries. In essence, when a state can show that federal
action implicates a governance interest, it establishes an Article III
injury. Part III also examines how the approach facilitates the clear
resolution of other threshold questions, such as whether the court has
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federal subject-matter jurisdiction and whether the state plaintiff has a
federal right of action. Currently, courts tend to overlook these threshold
questions, which are obscured by overly broad state standing analyses.
To illustrate the value of the approach, the Article ends with analyses of
two recent cases: Virginia’s challenge to the Affordable Care Act and
Texas’s recent challenge to a federal immigration policy regarding
deferred action. As the administrative state continues to address our
most pressing social and economic problems, state suits seeking to
litigate federal authority will only increase. Now is the time to clarify
when these states have standing under Article III.
I.

THE LITIGATION OF SOVEREIGNTY INTERESTS:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution grants the judicial power to
the federal courts.19 Based on the provision’s language and history, the
early Court interpreted Article III to limit judicial power to “cases” or
“controversies,” a requirement that precludes review of hypothetical
questions and generally prevents the issuance of advisory opinions.20
Article III, Section 2 also specifies that the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls and those in which a State shall be a Party.”21 In
the First Judiciary Act in 1789, Congress further specified that the Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction in all civil controversies between
states and had original, but not exclusive jurisdiction, in suits “between a
state and citizens of other states.”22 The Act did not expressly
contemplate suit against the federal government, although later statutes
specified that the Court has original (but not exclusive) jurisdiction over
controversies between the federal government and a state.23
The authors of the most influential historical analysis of state standing
in modern scholarship contend that Supreme Court precedent does not
generally support the justiciability of sovereignty (or “governance”)
interests under Article III.24 They argue that the federal courts generally
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
20. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 52–57 (noting the long-held and widely accepted
view that advisory opinions are unconstitutional and raising questions based on the critical
commentary surrounding this assumption).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
22. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
24. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 412 (1995).
Ann Woolhandler recently reaffirmed this view in light of intervening scholarship. Ann
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recognized only private common law interests as justiciable.25 In their
view, states were free to enforce their own laws in their own courts, but
could sue in federal court only when they could allege a traditional
common law injury to person or property.26
The historical analysis that follows in this part of the Article suggests
a different reading of this precedent. In the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, states did sue to vindicate governance interests in federal
court. What I call “governance” interests, the Court has called
“sovereign” or sometimes “quasi-sovereign” interests.27 It has
recognized them as justiciable under Article III in cases brought by a
state against another state and in state suits against the federal
government. Even cases frequently cited to support the nonjusticiability
thesis prove to be weak bases for a sweeping conclusion that the federal
courts have always understood these interests as outside Article III’s
grant of judicial power.
A.

Early Cases and Interstate Disputes

Early Supreme Court cases are sometimes read to suggest the Court’s
reluctance to consider sovereignty claims by state plaintiffs.28 In 1831,
for example, the Court refused to hear the Cherokee Nation’s request to
enjoin Georgia from enforcing its state laws in Cherokee territory
recognized by treaty with the United States.29 The state had enacted
various laws authorizing the acquisition and distribution of Cherokee
lands and otherwise flouting the Tribe’s rights to self-government.30
Historical accounts illuminate not only the tragic circumstances of this
Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209 (2014).
25. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24, at 412.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02
(1982).
28. See id.
29. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Although American Indian Tribes
have interests as separate sovereigns under federal law, their political and legal relationship with the
federal government is established by a series of treaties, which recognize the Tribes’ right to selfdetermination, as well as a federal trust responsibility over Indian Tribes and territory. Seth Davis,
Tribal Rights of Action, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 499, 528–29 (2014). Strong arguments may be made
that Tribes should have access to the federal courts to litigate their sovereignty interests. Id. at 529–
43; see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457, 464 (2d Cir. 2013)
(holding that Tribe had standing based on sovereignty interest in self-government to challenge
imposition of state tax on slot machines at Tribe’s casino). But because their historical, legal, and
political relationship with the federal government differs in many ways from the state-federal
relationship, the historical and doctrinal analyses in this Article do not necessarily extend to Tribes.
30. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 7–8.
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case, but also the precarious political environment in which it was
brought.31 Given the very real concern that a judicial injunction would
not be enforced, Chief Justice Marshall’s characterization of the
requested relief as an exercise of “political power” outside the
judiciary’s “proper province” is hardly surprising.32 Even so, this
characterization is dicta; his conclusion that the Court lacked jurisdiction
was based not on the case or controversy requirement, but on an analysis
that excluded the Cherokee Nation from the phrase “foreign state” in
Article III.33 In addition, two justices dissented, arguing that the Court
did have jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of state laws that violated
property rights secured to the Tribe by federal treaties.34
Other early decisions regarding the justiciability of sovereignty
interests must also be placed in historical context. In Mississippi v.
Johnson35 and Georgia v. Stanton,36 states challenged the federal
government’s authority under the Reconstruction Acts following the
Civil War. In both cases, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
enjoin the executive branch in its enforcement of laws that replaced state
government with federal military rule.37 In Stanton, the Court explained
that the judicial power does not extend to “the rights of sovereignty, of
political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate existence as a State,”
but is instead confined to rights of persons or property traditionally
litigated by individuals.38
Because this language distinguishes judicial from political power by
31. See, e.g., Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee
Cases, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 72 (Carole E. Goldberg et al. eds., 2011); JILL NORGREN, THE
CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION OF LAW AND POLITICS (1996); Joseph C. Burke, The
Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969). One year
later, the Court did invalidate a Georgia state law as infringing on the Cherokee Nation’s
sovereignty, but the state simply ignored the ruling, and the federal government did not enforce it.
See Rennard Strickland & William Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on Indian Law
and Policy, The Cherokee Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court Victories, 47 OKLA. L.
REV. 111, 112–15 (1994) (discussing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).
32. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20. In early cases, the Court often discussed justiciability under
Article III by distinguishing between “judicial” and “political” power. These cases are the
precursors to today’s standing and political question doctrines under Article III. See, e.g., Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 224–26 (1962) (discussing Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868) as
precedent relevant to the political question doctrine).
33. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20.
34. Justice Thompson wrote the dissent, in which Justice Story concurred. Id. at 80 (Thompson,
J., dissenting).
35. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
36. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868).
37. Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 499; Stanton, 73 U.S. at 77.
38. Stanton, 73 U.S. at 77.
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reference to individual common law rights, some commentators have
argued that the early Court required states to allege common law
injuries, and sovereignty interests were nonjusticiable.39 This argument
is arguably strengthened by the fact that the Court did entertain
constitutional challenges to Reconstruction legislation in habeas cases
brought by individuals held pursuant to military authority.40 But the
relief requested in these two kinds of cases was very different; in the
cases brought by states, the Court was asked to enjoin all executive
enforcement of two pieces of federal legislation, while in the habeas
cases, the Court was asked to grant more limited relief. Because a
declaration that the Reconstruction Acts were unconstitutional in their
entirety would have provoked a serious political conflict, the justices
were understandably reluctant to reach the merits of the case.41 The
language suggesting that states could not litigate “rights of sovereignty”
is therefore deeply rooted in historical context and should not be used to
support generalizations regarding the justiciability of governance
interests today.
Moreover, these cases are simply not representative of the Court’s
approach to sovereignty interests. States did in fact litigate sovereignty
interests—primarily in cases involving border disputes. As early as
1838, in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,42 the Court exercised its
original jurisdiction to hear disputes regarding interstate borders,
reasoning that the authors of the Constitution had such suits in mind in
giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over disputes between
states.43 The argument that border disputes involve nonjusticiable
questions of political sovereignty appeared in Chief Justice Taney’s

39. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24, at 418–19; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
1789–1888, at 303 (1985).
40. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866). When the Court was poised to rule on
the constitutionality of a detention in the South, Congress expressly repealed the Court’s
jurisdiction—a result that illustrates the political position of the Court at this time. See Ex Parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Congress limited the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in
habeas cases to preserve the terms of Reconstruction and not out of a desire to limit judicial power
generally. As others have noted, the same Congress expanded the federal courts’ jurisdiction in
various ways. See Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation
of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1158–59 (2011).
41. See Friedman & Delaney, supra note 40, at 1157–59 (describing the political tensions of the
time).
42. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
43. Id. at 723–24; see also Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900) (recognizing that the
Constitution gave the Supreme Court broader jurisdiction over interstate disputes than the common
law and that this “new branch of jurisdiction seemed to be necessary from the extinguishment of
diplomatic relations between the states”).
IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS,
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dissenting opinion44 and essentially faded over time as the Court
routinely decided cases involving borders and interstate water
allocation.45
By 1892, in a dispute between Texas and the United States regarding
territory in Oklahoma, the Court not only treated interstate border
disputes as an accepted part of its jurisdiction, but also distinguished
interstate litigation from suits involving states and private parties, noting
that the states consented to judicial resolution of intergovernmental
disputes when they entered into the union.46 Moreover, in deciding that
the case was appropriately brought as a suit in equity rather than law, the
Court explicitly characterized the dispute as one involving governmental
authority: “[i]t is not a suit simply to determine the legal title to, and the
ownership of [lands] . . . . It involves the larger question of
governmental authority and jurisdiction over that territory.”47
The intergovernmental litigation of sovereignty interests also
occurred in cases in which one state sued another to invalidate laws and
actions that allegedly interfered with the free flow of interstate
commerce. The Court initially grounded its jurisdiction in the state’s
own proprietary interests, as well as its interests in representing its
citizens. When Pennsylvania and Ohio challenged a West Virginia law
limiting the removal of natural gas from the state, the Court stressed the
states’ status as consumers of natural gas and as representatives of
citizen consumers whose use of the resource would be similarly curtailed
by the West Virginia restriction.48
But what is perhaps most remarkable about this case is that the Court
was willing to entertain a suit seeking a declaration regarding the
constitutionality of a state law prior to its application, rather than an
injunction against specific enforcement of its provisions.49 Indeed, in his
dissent, Justice Brandeis detailed the numerous procedural steps
(including application to West Virginia’s public service commission)
44. Rhode Island, 37 U.S. at 753 (Taney, J., dissenting).
45. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922) (exercising original jurisdiction over a
dispute between two states regarding allocation of water from interstate stream), vacated on other
grounds, 353 U.S. 953 (1957); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 84–85 (1907) (holding that the
Court had original jurisdiction over a dispute between Kansas and Colorado regarding the
appropriation of water from the Arkansas River); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 640 (1892)
(citing several cases as evidence that the Court’s jurisdiction over border disputes between states is
a settled question of law).
46. Texas, 143 U.S. at 646.
47. Id. at 648.
48. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591–92 (1923).
49. Id. at 581.
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that would precede state enforcement of export restrictions.50 Because
none of these steps had apparently been taken, Justice Brandeis
characterized the case as one to enjoin “legislation” (rather than
executive action) by seeking a “general declaration” regarding the state
law’s constitutionality—an abstract ruling that he argued fell short of the
case or controversy requirement of Article III.51
Decades later, the Court again concluded that states had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of a state law under the Commerce
Clause—in this case, Louisiana’s “first-use” tax on some natural gas
brought into Louisiana (which ultimately increased the price of such gas
to out-of-state consumers).52 Again, the Court concluded that the states
had standing as consumers of natural gas (a proprietary interest) and as
representatives of their consumer citizens.53 Though Justice Rehnquist
dissented, he actually agreed that the Court had original jurisdiction
under Article III and relevant statutes, but would have declined to
exercise that jurisdiction as a prudential matter because the states had
not advanced a sovereignty interest.54 He argued that the Court’s original
jurisdiction should be used only when a state “seeks to vindicate its
rights as a State, a political entity.”55 Justice Rehnquist’s characterization
of sovereignty is striking; in his view, questions of political sovereignty
(now described as states’ “rights”) are not only justiciable—they are the
questions most worthy of the Court’s original jurisdiction.
Only a decade later, in Wyoming v. Oklahoma,56 a majority of the
Court again agreed that sovereignty interests are appropriate grounds for
exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction.57 In deciding to exercise its
original jurisdiction over Wyoming’s claim that an Oklahoma law
violated the Commerce Clause, the Court emphasized the sovereign
interests of both states. In underscoring the “seriousness and dignity” of
the claim, Justice White noted that Oklahoma, “acting in its sovereign
capacity,” had passed legislation that limited Wyoming’s ability to
collect severance taxes from in-state coal companies.58
Moreover, in rejecting the argument that the Court should dismiss the
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 611–15 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 610.
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 766 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.
502 U.S. 437 (1992).
Id. at 451–52.
Id. at 451.
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suit because the issues could be litigated (by the coal companies) in
another forum, Justice White emphasized that no such suit was currently
pending, and even if it were, Wyoming’s interests as a “sovereign”
might not be adequately considered.59 In addition, he suggested that
Wyoming’s injury implicated its sovereign interests and that the
magnitude, or seriousness, of that injury should be assessed not only by
evaluating the impacts of Oklahoma’s discriminatory legislation, but
also by considering the impacts of similar laws should other states
decide to follow Oklahoma’s example.60 The fact that the state plaintiff
raised a question of governmental authority (in this case, federal
authority under the Commerce Clause) actually helped the state
overcome objections that its alleged injury to tax revenues was both
indirect and trivial (less than one percent of collected taxes).61
Indeed, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia highlighted the
attenuated nature of the alleged injury: though Oklahoma utilities had
certainly bought less Wyoming coal since the state law’s enactment, that
fact did not necessarily establish that Wyoming coal companies had sold
less coal (and that Wyoming had therefore suffered a loss in severance
tax revenues).62 But in contrast to the majority, Justice Scalia analyzed
state standing just as he would the standing of a private party, giving no
weight to the governance interests asserted or implicated by the case63—
a critical and continuing tension in contemporary Supreme Court
opinions regarding state standing. An approach to state standing that
explicitly recognizes governance interests would help explain decisions
like Wyoming v. Oklahoma and address “floodgate” objections to
expanding state standing, such as those raised by Justice Scalia in his
dissent, by acknowledging that state standing is and should be grounded
in different principles of justiciability.

59. Id. at 452.
60. Id. at 453 (“[T]he practical effect of [Oklahoma’s] statute must be evaluated not only by
considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged statute
may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of the other States and what effect would arise if
not one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
61. Id. at 448–49, 452–53.
62. Id. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 465–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, in which he argued that Wyoming had failed to allege facts
sufficient to show an injury in fact under Article III, and if it had met this burden, he would still
decline to exercise the Court’s original jurisdiction for prudential reasons.
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State Challenges to Federal Power in the Twentieth Century

Early in the twentieth century, the Court concluded it lacked
jurisdiction in cases in which states sought declarations that federal law
exceeded constitutional authority. In 1923, in Massachusetts v. Mellon,64
Massachusetts challenged a federal law that granted states federal
funding if they cooperated with the federal government in efforts to
improve maternal and infant health.65 The state argued that Congress had
violated the state’s rights under the Tenth Amendment by forcing it to
choose either to yield some of the authority (reserved to it under the
amendment) or to lose the federal funds appropriated under the act.66
The Court labeled the question presented as “political” and outside the
judicial power conferred by Article III, quoting older cases, such as
Georgia v. Stanton and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, for the proposition
that it may not render abstract opinions on the constitutionality of state
or federal laws.67 Other cases from this time period appear to use the
same logic to resolve similar state challenges to federal law.68
But a close reading of these cases reveals that they turn more on the
merits of the states’ claims than on the Court’s unwillingness to resolve
governance conflicts. In Mellon, though the Court dismissed the case for
“want of jurisdiction” and expressly stated that it was not deciding the
constitutional questions, it actually did decide the state’s Tenth
Amendment question.69 Rather than framing its analysis in terms of
constitutional jurisdiction, the Court inquired into the “nature of the
right” asserted by the state and analyzed what effect, if any, the federal
law had on that right.70 In disposing of the case, the Court expressly
acknowledged the state’s arguments in support of its Tenth Amendment
claim, particularly its contention that the federal law burdened the state
by attaching conditions to federal funding:
But what burden is imposed upon the states, unequally or
otherwise? Certainly there is none, unless it be the burden of
taxation, and that falls upon their inhabitants, who are within the
taxing power of Congress as well as that of the states where they
64. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 479–80.
67. Id. at 483–84.
68. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 16–17 (1927); New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 331
(1926).
69. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480.
70. Id. at 482.
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reside. Nor does the statute require the states to do or to yield
anything. If Congress enacted it with the ulterior purpose of
tempting them to yield, that purpose may be effectively
frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding.71
The Court then concluded that the federal law imposed no burden on the
states because it did not operate without state consent—foreshadowing
later cases under the Spending Clause.72 In effect, the Court did decide
the question of the statute’s constitutionality.
Other cases follow a similar path. In Florida v. Mellon,73 the Court
held that it lacked Article III jurisdiction over Florida’s challenge to a
federal tax on inheritances, but in doing so, it also declared that the
federal law was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing power
under the Court’s precedent.74 The Court further explained that, under
the Supremacy Clause, state law must yield and if the federal law
interfered with state authority or indirectly caused loss of tax revenue,
“that is a contingency which affords no ground for judicial relief.”75 The
Court also characterized the state’s alleged injury to its tax revenues—
premised on the theory that the federal law would cause taxpayers to
remove their property from the state—as “speculative” and “indirect.”76
In other words, the state’s claim that the federal government intruded on
the state’s regulatory authority lacked merit, and any argument that the
federal law somehow injured the state failed to state a valid claim for
judicial relief.
Similarly, in New Jersey v. Sargent,77 the Court held that the state had
not presented an Article III case or controversy in challenging parts of
the Federal Water Power Act as an unconstitutional exercise of authority
over intrastate waters, but it did so after discussing the reach of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power and the absence of a true conflict
with state authority.78 The state objected to the imposition of a federal
licensing and permitting scheme for the use of navigable waters in the
71. Id.
72. Id. at 483. Not surprisingly, in writing for the majority in South Dakota v. Dole, Chief Justice
Rehnquist cited Massachusetts v. Mellon in support of the proposition that state sovereignty is not
violated under the Tenth Amendment when a state may simply decline federal funds and thereby
avoid the federal conditions attached to such funds. 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987).
73. 273 U.S. 12 (1927).
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 18.
77. 269 U.S. 328 (1926).
78. Id. at 337 (summarizing “settled” doctrine regarding Congress’s power to regulate navigable
waters and characterizing the states’ power over waters within their borders as “subordinate”).
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state, but no specific license or permit was at issue and the state had not
alleged facts showing that the federal act interfered with any state law or
action that the state wished to take.79 Like Massachusetts v. Mellon and
Florida v. Mellon, the state had failed to show a true conflict regarding
federal-state authority over relevant activities or a direct injury to the
state itself as a regulated entity. Using modern legal concepts, we might
say today that the states in these cases failed to state a claim upon which
a court might grant relief.80
Language regarding the Court’s “lack of jurisdiction” must therefore
be placed in its historical context.81 The Court did not characterize its
disposition in terms of failure to state a valid claim because these cases
predate important legal developments, including the Supreme Court’s
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Prior to this
time, in the absence of a federal statutory or constitutional right, the right
to sue in federal court depended on the existence of an appropriate “form
of proceeding” taken from state law in cases at law and English chancery
practice in cases in equity.82 In order to have a “cause of action,” a
plaintiff’s case had to conform to one of these forms of proceeding.83
Each form of proceeding had its own procedural rules and prescribed the
79. Id. at 338–40; see also Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 162 (1922) (holding that Court lacked
jurisdiction, in part, because no “right” of the state was yet affected by application of challenged
federal law).
80. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction),
with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted).
81. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 180 (1992) (“The development of standing limitations in the early part of
the twentieth century was indeed a novelty, in the sense that no separate body of standing law
existed before this period.”).
82. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in
Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609, 667–77 (2015); see
also Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made
Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 258–89 (2010) (arguing that nineteenth-century
federal courts applied uniform, non-state equity principles based on English chancery sources—at
least with regard to remedies and procedures); John Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in
Constitutional Cases, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 24 (2013) (arguing that the federal courts
adopted English equity practices). In 1851, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the “common
law of chancery” in cases in equity. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13
How.) 518, 563 (1851). Of course, in 1945, the Court made clear that, in federal diversity cases,
state law would apply to substantive rights even when the plaintiff seeks equitable relief. Guar.
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
83. Bellia & Clark, supra note 82, at 632–34. The forms of proceeding specified remedies for
various injuries. For example, to recover damages for personal property taken by force, the
appropriate form of proceeding at common law would be one for an action of trespass vi et armis.
Id. at 633. If a plaintiff could not find a form of proceeding that provided the remedy for a given
injury, the plaintiff had no cause of action and therefore no access to the courts.
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relief, or remedy, available.84 Not surprisingly, federal courts often
spoke in terms of “jurisdiction” or the scope of judicial power when
analyzing whether a plaintiff had a “right” to sue—that is, when
analyzing whether the plaintiff’s case fit an appropriate form of
proceeding.85
Moreover, before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the merger of law and equity into a uniform “civil
action,” federal judges would have understood the concept of
“jurisdiction” to refer to either legal or equitable jurisdiction. This
distinction is critical to understanding the relevance of premerger cases
to Article III doctrines of justiciability. Before the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure erased the legal distinction between law and equity, the
Court’s threshold “jurisdictional” determination turned on whether the
plaintiff alleged a cause of action that fit a recognized form of
proceeding or judicial remedy.86 When states sought access to federal
court to challenge federal power, they filed bills in equity seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief.87 A federal court could not exercise its
jurisdiction (legal or equitable) unless the plaintiff state could establish a
cause of action by fitting its grievance and desired remedy into a form of
proceeding recognized by the federal courts. Indeed, even in Georgia v.
Stanton, a case often cited to support the proposition that states lack
standing to litigate sovereignty interests, the Court dismissed the case
because an injury to political rights did not establish a cause of action

84. Id. at 634.
85. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 337 (1926) (concluding that the allegations in
the bill in equity “do not suffice as a basis for invoking an exercise of judicial power”);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) (framing its jurisdictional inquiry as one about
the “right of the state” and how that right is affected by the federal statute); see also Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 827 (2004) (arguing that
Massachusetts v. Mellon “was only one of several cases decided before the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that today we characterize as ‘standing’ cases, but that the Court in
fact decided under traditional equitable principles”).
86. See Bellia, supra note 85, at 826 (“Standing did not emerge as a question distinct from
whether the plaintiff had a cause of action under a recognized form of proceeding until the merger
of law and equity in the federal system and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
Although other scholars have also argued that constitutional standing doctrine is a twentieth-century
invention, there is obviously some disagreement in the scholarship. Ann Woolhandler and Michael
Collins have argued that a discernable doctrine regarding state standing exists in early Supreme
Court cases. See generally Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24. Ann Woolhandler and Caleb
Nelson have similarly argued that early cases demonstrate a standing doctrine hostile to the
litigation of public rights by private citizens. Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History
Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 694–711 (2004).
87. See, e.g., Sargent, 269 U.S. at 330 (considering a bill in equity seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief).
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under the appropriate form of proceeding in an equitable action for an
injunction.88 In other words, the Court concluded that it lacked equitable
jurisdiction.89
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some of
its precedents conflate questions of Article III standing with the merits
question of whether the plaintiff has stated a valid claim for relief. 90
Recent cases suggest that the modern Court is inclined to apply a default
rule that distinguishes the two analyses: standing involves a
determination of whether the court has the “constitutional power to
adjudicate the case,” whereas the validity of an alleged cause of action
requires a merits determination that does not raise jurisdictional issues.91
Early nineteenth and twentieth-century precedents must therefore be
interpreted today in ways that are consistent with contemporary doctrine.
To determine whether the Court actually dismissed a state’s case for lack
of Article III jurisdiction requires a close reading of the Court’s analysis.
In many cases, the Court analyzes the reach of federal power and
essentially decides the merits of the state’s claim.
Furthermore, even if these early cases suggest an arguable reluctance
by the Court to decide regulatory conflicts between a state and the
federal government, they fall short of demonstrating that the Court never
exercised jurisdiction over such conflicts. Indeed, in one early twentiethcentury case, the Court expressly decided that it had equitable
jurisdiction over a state-federal conflict. In Missouri v. Holland,92
Missouri brought suit to enjoin a federal game warden from enforcing
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.93 The state alleged that the Act
88. The state asked the Court to enjoin the federal executive branch based on the state’s right to
exist—a request that did not fit neatly into an equitable action for an injunction:
[A]ccording to the course of proceeding under this head in equity, in order to entitle the party
to the remedy, a case must be presented appropriate for the exercise of judicial power; the
rights in danger, as we have seen, must be rights of persons or property, not merely political
rights, which do not belong to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or equity.
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 75–76 (1868).
89. Id.
90. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88
(2014); Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2361–2363 (2011).
91. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.4 (noting that the “absence of a valid (as opposed to
arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case” (internal quotations omitted)); see also John F. Preis,
How the Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies, and Jurisdiction, 67 FLA. L. REV.
849, 887–94 (2015) (arguing that the cause-of-action and jurisdictional inquiries continue to be
related in some contexts, such as determinations regarding state sovereign immunity and statutory
standing analyses).
92. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
93. Id. at 430–31.
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unconstitutionally invaded the regulatory authority reserved to the states
under the Tenth Amendment.94 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes
acknowledged the state’s asserted proprietary interest as owner of wild
game within its borders, but emphasized a different basis for jurisdiction.
He indicated that the state could bring the case to adjudicate its right to
control a resource over which it claimed ownership in its “sovereign
capacity.”95 Although it is impossible to know why the Court was
willing to expressly reach the merits in Holland, the existence of a state
statute recognizing state title in migratory birds arguably presented a
clearer regulatory conflict.96
In any event, state standing to adjudicate the proper division of
federal-state authority continued and—much like state standing to
challenge other states’ authority under the Commerce Clause—it
evolved over time to reach new questions of intergovernmental
authority. For example, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court
granted South Carolina leave to challenge provisions of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act (VRA) as exceeding federal constitutional authority.97 The
Court quickly dismissed many of the state’s constitutional arguments on
the ground that certain constitutional protections (such as those found in
the Due Process and Bill of Attainder Clauses) do not extend to states.98
The only remaining question was whether Congress exceeded its
authority under the Fifteenth Amendment (which prohibits racial
discrimination in voting) in passing legislation that imposed various
requirements on certain states and localities.99 The Court reached the
merits, holding that Congress did not exceed its constitutional
authority.100
94. Id. at 431.
95. Id. at 432. Justice Holmes also characterized the state’s rights as “quasi sovereign,” but did
not elaborate on what the term means. See id. at 431. I discuss the Supreme Court decisions that
refer to quasi-sovereign rights in Part II infra.
96. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. Justice Holmes’s opinion that federal law could constitutionally
preempt state authority in this area predates later cases in which he joined the Court in holding it
lacked jurisdiction. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921–1920, 1986
DUKE L.J. 65, 125 & nn.327–28 (noting that the Court followed Georgia v. Stanton and Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia in Massachusetts v. Mellon despite Justice Holmes’s “intervening” opinion in
Missouri v. Holland).
97. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 382 U.S. 898 (1965) (mem.) (granting South Carolina leave to
file in Court’s original jurisdiction). Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart indicated that they would
not have granted leave to file.
98. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
99. Id. at 324.
100. Id. at 325.
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Scholars have attempted to distinguish Katzenbach from earlier cases,
such as Massachusetts v. Mellon, that the Court dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds by characterizing the state’s interest in
Katzenbach as unique—either because the Constitution specifically
recognizes the state interest or because private parties are not likely to
have standing to vindicate it.101 But it is difficult to see why the specific
state interest in elections is determinative. Although the Constitution
acknowledges that states have regulatory authority over elections, it also
expressly acknowledges that Congress has the authority to preempt state
laws in this area.102 Furthermore, the second argument—that states have
standing because private litigants may not—has not been identified as a
basis for state standing in the Court’s jurisprudence. It is a normative
argument that partially justifies state standing in cases like Katzenbach,
but it does not fully theorize when states should have standing. At best, it
is a necessary condition, but no authority suggests that it is a sufficient
condition for state standing under Article III.
Moreover, under the reading of Massachusetts v. Mellon that I
propose, there is no need to distinguish Katzenbach. The preclearance
requirements imposed on states under the VRA forced covered states to
submit to significant federal oversight and therefore required state
action. The Act required certain states and localities to seek federal
approval of changes to local laws and to take various other actions that
they did not wish to take.103 In contrast, the federal laws challenged by
states in Mellon and contemporaneous cases did not require state action.
In those cases, the states either alleged no injury (e.g., Massachusetts
had not chosen to participate in the federal scheme to improve maternal
and infant health)104 or an indirect injury (e.g., Florida’s feared loss of
revenue as a result of a federal tax on inheritances).105 Even though the
Court framed its discussion in terms of jurisdiction, it nevertheless
resolved the constitutional challenges to federal authority raised by the
states. Though the Court’s modern standing inquiry requires that a
plaintiff establish an injury in fact, this was not established doctrine in
the early twentieth century. In these early cases, the state’s lack of injury
is a conclusion on the merits, not on the threshold issue of standing.
As the federal administrative state and budget grew in the latter half
101. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845,
858–65 (2012).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
103. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 319–20.
104. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923).
105. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927).
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of the twentieth century, states more frequently challenged federal
authority as unconstitutionally coercive, and their standing to do so went
unquestioned. These Tenth Amendment challenges generally fall into
two categories: challenges to conditions on federal funding designed to
influence state policy and challenges to federal laws that direct state
officials in the executive or legislative branches to administer or enact
federal laws.106 For example, in South Dakota v. Dole,107 the state
(unsuccessfully) challenged the conditioning of federal highway funds
on the adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one.108 Recently,
states (successfully) challenged federal conditions on funding tied to the
expansion of Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.109 State standing has also been unremarkable in cases, such as New
York v. United States110 and FERC v. Mississippi,111 where states have
claimed that the federal government is unconstitutionally
“commandeering” state officials into the service of the federal
government by forcing them to enact or administer federal laws and
policies.112
Given this more recent history, it is hardly surprising that when the
Court recently decided to revisit the constitutionality of preclearance
provisions of the VRA, Chief Justice Roberts, in writing for the
majority, did not even mention Article III or address whether the local
government that brought the suit had standing.113 In fact, this case goes
106. There is a third category of cases challenging federal power under the Tenth Amendment:
cases in which states challenge federal authority to regulate states qua states, that is, in the same
way it regulates private parties. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (challenge to
federal law denying income tax exemption for interest on certain state and local bonds); Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (challenge to federal overtime and
minimum-wage requirements applied to state and local entities). State standing is less controversial
in these cases because the state’s claim looks like that of a private party.
107. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
108. Id. at 205.
109. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
110. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
111. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
112. New York, 505 U.S. at 202. Woolhandler and Collins distinguish cases like New York v.
United States on the ground that the contested federal law is acting directly on “state machinery.”
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24, at 510. This factual distinction leads to their normative
argument: state standing is appropriate in these cases because it reinforces the federalism norm that
states and the federal government “act independently.” Id. But this argument ignores regulatory
reality: states and the federal government do not act independently in many areas. Moreover, the
line between acting directly on “state machinery” and acting in cooperation with state regulatory
machinery is impossible to draw.
113. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). The coverage formula determines which
states and localities must seek federal approval of changes in election laws.
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much further than Katzenbach because, as Justice Ginsburg argued in
her dissent, the majority decided the case by looking at how the Act’s
“coverage formula” applies generally, rather than focusing on the
Alabama county that brought the case.114 The Court’s willingness to
consider a facial challenge to the statute allowed one county to
adjudicate the interests of nonparties.115 The fact that Chief Justice
Roberts did not recognize this as a separate Article III concern suggests
that state litigation of governance interests is an accepted part of the
federal courts’ role today.116
The reality is that federal courts have been hearing these kinds of
cases—brought by states and localities challenging federal power—for
some time.117 At one point, state standing to litigate Tenth Amendment
issues had become so accepted that some federal courts of appeals
refused to hear Tenth Amendment claims brought by individuals on the
theory that such claims involved injuries to states’ rights.118 Although
these courts relied heavily on an old case in which the Supreme Court
refused to hear a Tenth Amendment challenge by private power
companies, they also bolstered their conclusions with prudential
standing analyses.119 In holding that only states had standing to litigate
114. Id. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be
applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.” (citation omitted)).
115. Id. at 2621–22 (stating that Shelby County sought “a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b)
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional”).
116. Facial challenges have long been the exception in standing jurisprudence—reserved
essentially for First Amendment challenges based on freedom of speech. Interestingly, however, a
body of constitutional scholarship recognizes the Court’s willingness to decide facial challenges in
cases questioning the extent of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause—cases brought by
individual litigants. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435,
1456–57 (2013) (discussing facial challenges based on a structural right, e.g., the Tenth
Amendment); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 907
(2005) (discussing the Court’s willingness to decide facial challenges to Commerce Clause
legislation).
117. See, e.g., Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that Wyoming had standing because federal agency interpretation of regulation would
“interfere[] with Wyoming’s ability to enforce its legal code”); Alaska v. Dep’t of Transp., 868 F.2d
441, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that state had standing based on sovereignty interest to challenge
federal agency orders that preempted state consumer protection laws). The governance approach I
propose in Part III would actually stop short of granting state standing in these two examples. I note
these cases only as examples of state litigation of sovereignty interests in the lower courts.
118. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 216 (2011) (citing circuit court cases); Mountain
States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980) (“Only the State has standing to
press claims aimed at protecting its sovereign powers under the Tenth Amendment.”).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 527–28 (8th Cir. 2009) (following Tenn.
Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118 (1939), but noting that the court’s decision is

10 - Roesler.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

6/3/2016 12:49 PM

STATE STANDING TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL AUTHORITY

659

questions of federalism, courts noted that their decisions furthered the
principle that a party may not establish Article III standing by asserting
the legal rights of third parties.120 In this view, if individuals can
challenge federal power by asserting states’ sovereignty interests, they
may force the federal courts to decide governance issues that no state
wishes to decide and that states are generally in the best position to
litigate.121
In 2011, in Bond v. United States,122 the Supreme Court rejected this
approach to standing in Tenth Amendment cases, holding that
individuals may challenge federal law as an unconstitutional interference
with state sovereignty provided they satisfy the Article III requirements
of injury, causation and redressability.123 Justice Kennedy, writing for a
unanimous Court, emphasized the individual liberty interests protected
by the Constitution’s vertical division of authority between the federal
government and the states.124 Although he stressed the individual interest
in this vertical allocation of power, he did so against a clear background
assumption that states also have standing to bring constitutional
challenges to federal laws that interfere with their sovereignty
interests.125 Indeed, because individuals must demonstrate their own
concrete, particular injury, along with causation and redressability,
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that, in some cases, a state might be “the
only entity capable of demonstrating the requisite injury.”126 The critical
point for purposes of state standing analysis is that the Court in Bond
treated state standing based on sovereignty interests as uncontroversial.
II.

SEPARATING SUITS BASED ON SOVEREIGNTY
INTERESTS FROM REPRESENTATIVE SUITS
If the Supreme Court has a long history of permitting states to litigate

consistent with a prudential standing analysis).
120. Id.
121. Costle, 630 F.2d at 761 (noting the reasons for the prudential limitation on third-party
standing).
122. 564 U.S. 211 (2011).
123. Id. at 225.
124. Id. at 220–24.
125. This assumption is clear in his description of an individual’s interest in federalism as
additional to the states’ interests: “[t]he limitations that federalism entails are not therefore a matter
of rights belonging only to the States. . . . Fidelity to principles of federalism is not for the States
alone to vindicate.” Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 225; see also Huq, supra note 116, at 1515 (arguing that, in federalism cases, state
standing is more consistent with Article III principles than individual standing).

10 - Roesler.docx (Do Not Delete)

660

6/3/2016 12:49 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:637

sovereignty interests, why have the federal courts struggled to articulate
doctrinal bases for state standing in recent cases, such as those
challenging federal health insurance legislation and federal
administrative action in the environmental and immigration contexts?
The answer to this question turns in part on how the concept of quasisovereign interests developed in twentieth-century opinions regarding
state standing.
Early cases recognize a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in suing on
behalf of its citizens in limited contexts, namely, in situations where an
interstate nuisance that originates outside the state threatens the wellbeing of the state’s citizens.127 Because states had relinquished the right
to use force or diplomacy when they entered the federal union, they
needed a forum in which to settle these interstate disputes. Jurisdiction in
the federal courts, particularly original jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court, was part of the founding bargain; states would cede some
sovereign prerogatives when they agreed to a federal union, but they
would be able to litigate interstate disputes in federal court.128
But in 1982, the Court greatly expanded the representative (or parens
patriae) suit in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,129 a case that
involved a federal statutory scheme with a significant administrative role
for the states. In Puerto Rico, the Court recognized a state’s quasisovereign interest in securing for its citizens the benefits of federal laws
generally.130 Because of the tremendous increase in federal statutory law
by the middle of the twentieth century, this subtle doctrinal move
arguably supports state representative standing to enforce the benefits of
most, if not all, federal laws. The majority in Massachusetts v. EPA drew
from this line of precedent and created further confusion by attempting
to reconcile it with the Court’s individual standing requirements of
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.131
This Part makes the argument that we cannot understand the state
interests that support standing today without understanding how the
concept of quasi-sovereignty changed in response to the growing
administrative state. It begins by tracing the doctrinal development of
the concept of quasi-sovereign interests from its origins to the Court’s
127. See Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 673–74 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining that the
early representative state suits involved disputes over water allocation and interstate pollution).
128. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 16–17 (noting the recognition by delegates to
the Constitutional Convention of the need for the federal judiciary to resolve interstate disputes).
129. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
130. Id. at 608.
131. 549 U.S. 497, 521–26 (2007).
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decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. The requirement that a state allege a
quasi-sovereign interest began as a tool designed to limit the Court’s
original jurisdiction in interstate nuisance cases. As federal law grew in
an effort to reach various economic and social problems, the Court
adapted the concept of quasi-sovereignty to include a state’s interest in
securing the benefits of federal law for its citizens.
The Massachusetts Court used this capacious understanding of quasisovereignty to justify “special solicitude” for states in analyzing
standing, but quasi-sovereignty’s confused doctrinal legacy makes the
majority’s decision difficult to understand and apply. Legal scholars,
practitioners, and judges continue to debate exactly what this “special
solicitude” is and when it is triggered.132 But to date, no one has
scrutinized the historical development of core concepts, such as quasisovereignty, in the cases relied on by the Massachusetts majority. As the
following Section demonstrates, the confusion did not begin with
Massachusetts. It has a much deeper history beginning with interstate
public nuisance cases and ending with Puerto Rico’s suit to vindicate its
citizens’ interests under federal law. This Part sheds much-needed light
on what the majority’s opinion means and how it should be applied in
future cases.

132. See, e.g., Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L. REV.
2051, 2079 (2011) (arguing that states should have standing to sue federal government based on
their sovereign interests); Kirsten H. Engel, State Standing in Climate Change Lawsuits, J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 233 (2011) (arguing that the Massachusetts Court should have based its
standing analysis solely on parens patriae doctrine); Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater
Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1773 (2008) (arguing that states have special standing as parens
patriae under pre-Massachusetts precedent); Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v.
EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 281–83 (2009) (arguing that Massachusetts allows states standing as
parens patriae to vindicate generalized injuries when individual citizens would not have standing);
Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RES. &
ENVTL. L. 273, 318–20 (2007) (arguing that the Massachusetts Court should have based standing
analysis on California’s sovereign interest in enacting its own emissions standards under CAA
§ 209(b)(1)); Robert A. Weinstock, Note, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of
Public Goods, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 836–42 (2009) (arguing states should have standing to sue
federal government when citizens suffer injury to a public good); Sarah Zdeb, Note, From Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA: Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming
Plaintiffs, 96 GEO. L.J. 1059 (2008) (arguing that states should be able to sue the federal
government as parens patriae in climate change litigation).
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A.

Quasi-Sovereign Interests and the Representative (Parens Patriae)
Suit

1.

Early Twentieth-Century Cases and the Origins of QuasiSovereignty

A state suing in its representative capacity, on behalf of its citizens, is
frequently said to be suing in its capacity as parens patriae, which
means “parent of his or her country.”133 This concept originated in
England as a means of invoking the prerogative of the king, or
sovereign.134 For example, when a charitable bequest would fail for want
of a clear beneficiary or because of an illegal purpose, the king as parens
patriae had the right to dispose of the funds according to the public
interest.135 The king also served as parens patriae in matters affecting
the rights of individuals otherwise unable to represent their own interests
(such as minors or individuals with mental disabilities).136
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court acknowledged this
history and recognized the people—represented through their respective
legislatures—as the sovereign equivalent of the English crown:
When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives
of the crown devolved upon the people of the states. And this
power still remains with them, except so far as they have
delegated a portion of it to the Federal government. The
sovereign will is made known to us by legislative
enactment. . . . The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.137
In other words, the idea of “parens patriae” is synonymous with
sovereignty, which inheres in the state and federal governments. But it is
also tied to specific ends, namely, the protection of the public interest
and care for “those who cannot protect themselves.”138
Given this understanding, the idea of the state acting as parens
patriae in the early twentieth century appears to overlap considerably

133. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014).
134. Wheeler v. Smith, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 55, 77 (1850).
135. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,
57 (1890).
136. Id. at 57–58. See generally Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens
Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
137. Wheeler, 50 U.S. at 78.
138. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 57; see also Michael Malina &
Michael D. Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 NW.
U. L. REV. 193, 197–202 (1970) (tracing the history of the royal prerogative).
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with the concept of a state’s police power.139 Both concepts are
expressions of the sovereign’s power to govern in the public interest. As
the Court articulated it in 1894, a state’s police power “include[s]
everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals, and to
justify the destruction or abatement . . . of whatever may be regarded as
a public nuisance.”140 Historically, only the sovereign, or king, could
bring an action to abate a public nuisance.141 Of course, to abate an
interstate public nuisance, that is, a nuisance originating in another state,
a state could not seek redress in its own courts, nor could it use
diplomatic or military powers to resolve the problem. Not surprisingly,
the Supreme Court recognized interstate nuisance cases as proper cases
over which to exercise federal jurisdiction.142
These cases were suits in equity invoking the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction. The Court was understandably worried about the
possibility of states invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction in their
capacities as parens patriae whenever actions occurring in another state
had an adverse effect on their citizens’ interests. To ensure that its
original jurisdiction was not overwhelmed by such cases, at the turn of
the twentieth century, the Court made clear that it would look beyond
the named parties to ensure that the case presented a controversy
139. One early treatise includes citations to Supreme Court cases discussing the states’ police
power in an entry on the “doctrine of parens patriae.” HEMAN W. CHAPLIN, PRINCIPLES OF THE
FEDERAL LAW AS IN DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 267 n.3 (1917). Courts and commentators
have often characterized the twentieth-century development of the parens patriae lawsuit by state
plaintiffs as diverging from or greatly expanding upon earlier cases. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); Malina & Blechman, supra note 138, at 202. But nineteenthcentury language regarding sovereignty and state power suggests that courts had already begun
harmonizing the English concept with ideas of popular sovereignty.
140. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894). In Lawton, the Court listed various state actions
that had been held to be within the state police power. Id. Among the listed actions are examples of
state actions historically falling within its role as parens patriae. Id. (noting as permissible state
action “the compulsory vaccination of children [and] the confinement of the insane or those
afflicted with contagious diseases”).
141. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *219 (noting that—with few exceptions—a
public nuisance action must be brought by “the king in his public capacity of supreme governor, and
pater-familias of the kingdom”).
142. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (exercising original jurisdiction in suit
by Wyoming to enjoin diversion of interstate water by Colorado); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230 (1907) (exercising original jurisdiction in suit by Georgia to enjoin copper companies from
emitting “noxious” gas into Georgia); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (exercising original
jurisdiction in suit by Kansas to enjoin diversion of river water by Colorado); Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (exercising original jurisdiction over Missouri’s suit to enjoin discharge
into Mississippi River by the Sanitary District of Chicago). Interstate water disputes arising under
interstate compacts continue to be the most common cases over which the Court exercises its
original jurisdiction.
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between two states as required by the Constitution.143 In Louisiana v.
Texas, the Court dismissed a suit by Louisiana seeking to enjoin a Texas
health official’s implementation of quarantine regulations so as to
impose an embargo on interstate commerce between Texas and New
Orleans.144 The Court held that the state may not bring a parens patriae
suit to vindicate its citizens’ interests because the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to controversies between states.145
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that allowing
representative suits by one state against another state would undermine
states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suit by citizens
of another state.146
The Court’s interest in limiting its original jurisdiction may also be
the reason that, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., Justice Holmes
emphasized Georgia’s quasi-sovereign interest when it sought to enjoin
the emission of “noxious” air pollutants from copper companies in
Tennessee.147 In addition to ensuring the case was a suitable one for the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, the Court had to ensure that it
exercised its equitable jurisdiction according to established principles
governing equitable remedies—including the principle that injunctive
relief is inappropriate if an adequate legal remedy exists.148 To justify
granting Georgia’s request for an injunction, Justice Holmes emphasized
the state’s quasi-sovereign interests:
This is a suit by a state for an injury to it in its capacity of quasisovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent
of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air
within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its
mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants
shall breathe pure air.149
He then described the state’s interests as a private property owner as
“merely a makeweight.”150
This emphasis on a state’s quasi-sovereign rights in “all the earth and
143. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
144. Id. at 23.
145. Id. at 19.
146. Id. at 16; see also id. at 25 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that a state may not “even with
[its citizens’] consent, make their case its case and compel the offending state and its authorities to
appear as defendants in an action brought in this court”).
147. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236.
148. Id. at 237.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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air” within its borders helped support the Court’s decision not to engage
in the typical balancing of interests required for injunctive relief.151
Recognizing that federal jurisdiction in the courts is the logical
alternative to the force surrendered by states when they entered the
union, Justice Holmes emphasized that states “did not sink to the
position of private owners subject to one system of private law.”152
Rather, the state had a “sovereign” right to protect its natural resources
even if out-of-state interests suffer “possible disaster” as a result.153
The notion of quasi-sovereignty therefore began as a means of
limiting a state cause of action in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Based
on their status as parens patriae, states could invoke the Court’s original
(and sometimes exclusive) jurisdiction to seek equitable relief for
injuries to their citizens by out-of-state defendants, but only if a quasisovereign interest in “earth and air” were at stake. This interpretation is
bolstered by the fact that the Court was less troubled by the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction in parens patriae suits brought by states or state
officials. For example, the Court exercised appellate jurisdiction over a
state’s Tenth Amendment challenge to a law facilitating the conversion
of state building and loan associations into federal savings and loan
associations.154 In doing so, the Court noted the state’s quasi-sovereign
interest in governing corporations created under state law and its
separate status as “parens patriae, acting in a spirit of benevolence for
the welfare of its citizens,” including the shareholders of corporations.155
Only three years later, the Court explicitly noted its concern in
allowing parens patriae suits to be heard in the Court’s original
jurisdiction in a representative suit filed by Oklahoma to enforce the
liability of a shareholder of an insolvent bank over which the state bank
commissioner had control.156 The Court quoted Tennessee Copper’s
quasi-sovereign language, but emphasized that quasi-sovereign interests
do not include all representative cases—that is, cases “in the name of the
State but in reality for the benefit of particular individuals [here the
bank’s creditors].”157 The Court concluded by stressing that many states
had similar statutory provisions for liquidating insolvent banks and
noting that an “enormous burden” would result if it were to exercise
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 238.
Id.
Id. at 239.
Hopkins Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935).
Id. at 340.
Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938).
Id. at 393–94.
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original jurisdiction over such cases.158
In addition to limiting the Court’s exercise of its original jurisdiction
over representative suits, the idea of quasi-sovereignty also served as a
means of protecting state sovereign immunity from suit. The same day
that the Court decided Tennessee Copper, it also decided a dispute
between Kansas and Colorado regarding water rights.159 Kansas sued
Colorado to enjoin a diversion of water from the Arkansas River that
would affect water flow in Kansas.160 In concluding that the case was
justiciable in its original jurisdiction, the Court emphasized that,
although Kansas was suing on behalf of her citizens, the action did not
undermine Colorado’s sovereign immunity from suit by private
citizens.161 This was so because the environmental impact of the water
diversion would affect the “general welfare of the state.”162 Citing
Tennessee Copper, the Court characterized the case as “involv[ing] a
matter of state interest.”163 In other words, the state’s quasi-sovereign
interest in a natural resource ensured that Kansas was not simply suing
on behalf of private interests in an effort to overcome Colorado’s
sovereign immunity from suit.164
None of this suggests that the exercise of federal jurisdiction over
parens patriae suits in the lower federal courts would be constitutionally
impermissible.165 But what it does suggest is that the principle of quasisovereignty began as a principle designed to limit the Court’s original
158. Id. at 396. The Court has continued to follow this approach to parens patriae suits in its
original jurisdiction. In Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, for example, the Court denied Pennsylvania’s
motion for leave to file a parens patriae action because its suit “represents nothing more than a
collectivity of private suits against New Jersey for taxes withheld from private parties.” 426 U.S.
660, 666 (1976).
159. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
160. Id. at 47–48.
161. Id. at 99.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. The Court has extended this reasoning to suits for monetary relief. For example, in a more
recent case involving the Arkansas River, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar
Kansas’s original action against Colorado for monetary damages because Kansas was the real party
in interest and was not simply seeking to recover damages for individual citizens. Kansas v.
Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 8 (2001); see also Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 132 n.7 (1987)
(noting that the “enforcement of [an interstate water] Compact was of such general public interest
that the sovereign State was a proper plaintiff”).
165. States would, of course, need statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. Because states are not
“citizens,” they lack the “diversity of citizenship” necessary for federal diversity jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). Subject-matter jurisdiction would therefore depend on the existence of a
federal question. Today, this would essentially require that a state suing as parens patriae assert a
federal statutory or common law cause of action.
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jurisdiction over public nuisance cases brought by states and to ensure
private litigants could not overcome state sovereign immunity by suing
through a nominal state party. The concept of quasi-sovereignty did not
originally expand states’ standing to litigate questions regarding their
regulatory authority (i.e., governance interests) under the Constitution. It
also did not limit a state’s standing in parens patriae actions brought on
behalf of its citizenry—except in cases brought in the Court’s original
jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, however, the Court began citing Tennessee Copper
and other public nuisance cases for the general proposition that a state
could sue in a representative capacity as long as a “substantial portion”
of its population was threatened with injury and the state had a quasisovereign interest, described as “an interest apart from that of the
individuals affected.”166 In 1923, the Court extended the Court’s original
jurisdiction over representative suits by recognizing state representative
standing in an interstate commerce case.167 Two states sought to enjoin
enforcement of a West Virginia law restricting the out-of-state flow of
natural gas produced in West Virginia as a violation of the Commerce
Clause.168 The fact that the constitutional challenge involved a natural
resource made the case appear analogous to the public nuisance cases
and amenable to Tennessee Copper’s language regarding a state’s quasisovereign interest in the earth and air.169 It was this subtle extension of
state representative standing beyond interstate nuisance actions to
constitutional questions of regulatory authority that provided an opening
for the Court’s much greater expansion in Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad170 in 1945.171
In Pennsylvania Railroad, in a five-four decision, the Court turned the
concept of quasi-sovereignty on its head by using it to support the
Court’s original jurisdiction over a parens patriae suit brought by
Georgia to enjoin a private price-fixing scheme in violation of federal
antitrust laws.172 Georgia alleged that the defendant railroads had
conspired to fix excessive, discriminatory rates on freight moving into
and out of Georgia. The Court allowed Georgia to invoke its original
jurisdiction based on general injury to the state’s economy (which
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).
Id.
Id. at 583.
See id. at 592 (citing public nuisance cases).
324 U.S. 439 (1945).
See id. at 449–51 (discussing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923)).
Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. at 450.
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naturally threatens its citizens’ welfare).173 Likening trade barriers and
discrimination in interstate commerce to the “noxious gas” and the
“deposit of sewage” found in the public nuisance cases, the Court used
sweeping language to describe the potential injuries to the “prosperity
and welfare” of the state.174 Because federal antitrust laws authorized
states (as “persons”) to sue for injunctive relief, the Court also concluded
that Georgia had a cause of action.175
This decision disconnected the idea of quasi-sovereignty from its
association with natural resources and common law causes of action for
interstate nuisance. After Pennsylvania Railroad, if a state could
establish a right of action under federal law, it could invoke the Court’s
original jurisdiction in a parens patriae suit based on a general injury to
its economy.176 Many questions, such as how widespread the injury must
be, remained unanswered, but one thing was clear: the concept of quasisovereignty no longer meaningfully limited the Court’s original
jurisdiction. As the next Section demonstrates, once it was divested of its
original purpose, the concept of quasi-sovereignty was free to serve
another purpose: it could describe the states’ position in a growing
federal administrative state.
2.

Puerto Rico v. Alfred L. Snapp & Son: Quasi-Sovereignty Applied
to the State-Federal Relationship

In 1978, Puerto Rico sued Virginia apple growers in federal district
court, seeking a declaration that the growers had violated federal labor
and immigration laws as well as an injunction against future violations
of these laws.177 According to the complaint, the apple growers violated
173. See id. at 447 (“The rights which Georgia asserts, parens patriae, are those arising from an
alleged conspiracy of private persons whose price-fixing scheme, it is said, has injured the economy
of Georgia.”).
174. Id. at 451. The Court described the potential injury as “permanent and insidious” and
described its consequences in dire terms: “Georgia as a representative of the public is complaining
of a wrong, which if proven, limits the opportunities of her people, shackles her industries, retards
her development, and relegates her to an inferior economic position among her sister States.” Id. at
451.
175. Id. at 462.
176. Because general injury to a state’s economy is enough for Article III standing, the main
threshold question in these cases is whether a federal right and remedy exist. Indeed, when Hawaii
later brought a parens patriae suit for damages under the Clayton Act, the key question was whether
the federal antitrust statute provided the states with a right of action for monetary damages. Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 259–60 (1972). The Court emphasized that it was not
questioning whether Hawaii could sue in its capacity as parens patriae, but whether the federal law
at issue provided the requested remedy. Id.
177. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 928, 930 (W.D. Va.
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federal law by failing to employ workers from Puerto Rico before
employing foreign workers and subjecting Puerto Rican workers to
unequal working conditions.178 Under a federal statute, employers such
as the apple growers could not employ foreign workers before taking
certain administrative steps to facilitate the hiring of workers from the
domestic labor market, which included Puerto Rico.179 In addition, an
employer could not discriminate against domestic workers by treating
them less favorably than foreign employees.180
Federal statutes then and now establish a national employment service
under the oversight of federal authorities, primarily the Secretary of
Labor, but dependent on state cooperation and participation.181 In return
for federal funds, a state (including Puerto Rico) must create an agency
that supports the objectives of the federal employment service.182 In
Puerto Rico’s suit against the apple growers, the critical objective
implemented by the relevant state agencies was the maintenance of a
clearance system whereby employers in one state could communicate
their employment needs to all other participating states.183 According to
Puerto Rico’s complaint, the relevant agency, the Puerto Rico
Employment Service, received job orders through this system for 2318
temporary workers to harvest apples in east coast orchards.184 The Puerto
Rican government recruited 1094 of its nearly three million citizens, but
only 992 traveled to the mainland after someone at the federal labor
department reported that Virginia apple growers were refusing to
employ workers from Puerto Rico.185 Only 420 of the 992 workers
arrived in Virginia, and fewer than thirty remained after only a few
weeks.186
Responding to the apple growers’ motion to dismiss for lack of
constitutional standing, the federal district court analyzed whether
Puerto Rico had standing in its capacity as parens patriae. Noting that
Puerto Rico’s quasi-sovereign interest was based solely on its general
economy, the court expressed concern that state standing to sue based on
1979).
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 929.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 49 (2012).
Id. § 49c.
Id. § 49b(a).
Puerto Rico, 469 F. Supp. at 930.
Id.
Id.
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such interest “would permit a state to challenge any business or
governmental decision which would adversely affect[] its economy.”187
The court then considered various factors, such as the size of the
population affected, the magnitude of the harm, and the availability of
private suits for relief.188 Given that only a relatively small segment of
Puerto Rico’s population was affected and private suits were available,
the district court concluded that Puerto Rico lacked standing.189
After a divided panel on the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court’s decision,190 the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.191 The
Court treated the suit as one brought by Puerto Rico on behalf of its
citizens (that is, as a parens patriae suit) and required that Puerto Rico
demonstrate a quasi-sovereign interest.192 In doing so, the Court subtly
extended the quasi-sovereign requirement once again. The concerns that
had once motivated the Court to require the state to be more than a
“nominal” party were not present in this case. Puerto Rico did not
attempt to bring suit in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Moreover,
because the defendants were not states, the concern that a state could
undermine state sovereign immunity by suing in place of individual
citizens was not present.
The Court did not mention these concerns,193 but instead surveyed the
precedents in an effort to deduce what quasi-sovereignty might mean.
After listing and discussing the interstate public nuisance cases, the
Court stressed that “parens patriae interests extend well beyond the
prevention of such traditional public nuisances.”194 While the Court
acknowledged the interstate public nuisance cases, it did not
acknowledge that the concept of quasi-sovereignty was historically
connected to a state’s right to protect its natural resources.195 Citing
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, the Court also characterized the
“economic well being” of a state’s citizenry as a quasi-sovereign

187. Id. at 931.
188. Id. at 932–34.
189. Id. at 934–35.
190. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc., 632 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1980).
191. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
192. Id. at 601.
193. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan acknowledged these concerns and noted that
parens patriae suits in the Court’s original jurisdiction may require a more “restrictive approach.”
Id. at 611 (Brennan, J. concurring).
194. Id. at 605.
195. Id. at 604–05.
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interest.196 In concluding its overview of relevant precedent, the Court
emphasized that the “public nuisance and economic well-being lines of
cases were specifically brought together in Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad.”197
The Court then used Pennsylvania Railroad to carve out a second
category of quasi-sovereign interests related to a state’s relationship with
the federal government:
[T]he state has an interest in securing observance of the terms
under which it participates in the federal system. In the context
of parens patriae actions, this means ensuring that the State and
its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to flow
from participation in the federal system.198
Having created this new category of quasi-sovereign interests, the Court
held that Puerto Rico could sue on behalf of its citizens to ensure their
“full and equal participation in the federal employment service
scheme.”199 According to the Court, Puerto Rico’s interest in securing
the benefits of federal law for its citizens was “not distinguishable from”
Georgia’s interest under the federal antitrust laws in Pennsylvania
Railroad.200 Instead of viewing the quasi-sovereign interest in
Pennsylvania Railroad as a state’s interest in its general economy, the
Court characterized it as an interest in securing the benefits of federal
law.201
The Court’s subtle reasoning in Puerto Rico dramatically changed the
concept of quasi-sovereignty. No longer was it tied to interstate disputes
regarding natural resources or to the preservation of states’ immunity
from suit by citizens of other states. In addition to bringing traditional
parens patriae suits based on the general public welfare, a state could
now sue to further its citizens’ interests under federal statutes. What
began as a concept designed to limit federal court jurisdiction over
interstate disputes was now a concept describing the state’s interest in
participating in a federal administrative scheme—even when the federal
statutes at issue do not contemplate state enforcement authority.202 In
196. Id. at 605.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 608.
199. Id. at 609.
200. Id. at 610.
201. Id.
202. The Court did not analyze whether Puerto Rico had an implied cause of action to sue under
the relevant statutes. Given the modern Court’s reluctance to find such causes of action without
clear evidence of congressional intent, the case would likely be decided differently today. In fact,
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other words, the Court transformed a concept used to describe a state’s
sovereignty interests vis-à-vis other states into a concept used to describe
a state’s sovereignty interests vis-à-vis the federal government.
This doctrinal shift essentially erased any distinction between a state’s
sovereign interest and its quasi-sovereign interest. Although the Court
identified two kinds of “sovereign” interests distinct from a state’s quasisovereign interests, it did not clearly define them.203 First, the Court
identified the state’s sovereign interest in governing its citizens, which
implicates its “power to create and enforce a legal code” and which “is
regularly at issue in constitutional litigation,”204 presumably, for
example, when a state seeking to enforce its laws must respond to a
defendant’s constitutional challenge. The second “kind” of sovereign
interest is “the demand for recognition from other sovereigns,” which
often involves interstate border disputes.205 The Court quoted language
from Pennsylvania Railroad about the framers’ desire to provide states
with a peaceful forum in which to settle disputes—language it had
previously used to justify the exercise of its original jurisdiction on the
basis of a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in resolving interstate
disputes.206
This metamorphosis in doctrine makes sense only when considered in
tandem with the development of the administrative state in the twentieth
century.207 Pennsylvania Railroad’s expansion of a state’s quasisovereign interest to include its interest in its general economy occurred
a decade after the New Deal’s expansion of federal authority over
economic issues in the wake of the Great Depression.208 The Supreme
Court decided Puerto Rico in 1982 after roughly two decades of
unprecedented congressional expansion of federal administrative
authority over health, safety and environmental issues—the very issues
traditionally within the state’s police power. The regulatory landscape
had changed. States now governed alongside and in cooperation with
contemporaneous decisions suggest that most courts would not have implied a private right of
action even at that time. See, e.g., Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam) (holding domestic workers did not have private cause of action under federal law for
employers’ unlawful hiring of foreign workers, which deprived them of employment).
203. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. at 601.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189 (1986).
208. See id. at 1252 (describing the New Deal’s belief in governmental intervention in the market
as a dramatic break from a previously “constrained view of national power”).
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federal administrative agencies. They could not competently exercise
their police powers—their authority as parens patriae—without
participating in the modern administrative state.
This regulatory reality permeates the Puerto Rico decision.
Significantly, the Court concluded by emphasizing the importance of the
federal-state relationship contemplated by the underlying statutory
scheme: “Indeed, the fact that the Commonwealth participates directly in
the operation of the federal employment scheme makes even more
compelling its parens patriae interest in assuring that the scheme
operates to the full benefit of its residents.”209 The Court did not say why
participation in the federal scheme made Puerto Rico’s interest “more
compelling,” but Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, joined by three
other justices, contains a clue.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan also emphasized Puerto
Rico’s role in implementing the federal law. He described Puerto Rico’s
interest as a sovereign interest because the alleged violations of federal
law “directly interfere with Puerto Rico’s ability to perform the job
referral service that it has undertaken as part of its sovereign
responsibility to its citizens.”210 Because states could not regulate public
welfare and the economy without cooperating to some extent with the
federal government, Justice Brennan’s approach accurately described the
interest at issue in the case. Puerto Rico’s interest in the lawful operation
of the federal administrative scheme provided a stronger foundation than
the doctrine of parens patriae, which was rooted in the absolute
authority of the king, or the idea of quasi-sovereignty, which was
designed with interstate relations in mind. Of course, sovereignty
interests tend to be litigated in suits against other sovereigns, making
this a less-than-ideal case for such an approach. But Massachusetts v.
EPA did not present the same problem, and as the following Section
illustrates, state-standing doctrine would be much more coherent today if
the Massachusetts Court had adopted Justice Brennan’s approach.
B.

Massachusetts v. EPA: From Quasi-Sovereignty Back to
Sovereignty

In 1999, various private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with
the EPA, requesting that the agency regulate greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act (CAA).211
209. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. at 610.
210. Id. at 611 n.1.
211. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007).
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Four years later, the EPA denied the petition, concluding that it lacked
authority under the CAA to promulgate regulations addressing global
climate change and that—even if it did have such authority—it would
choose not to do so for a number of reasons.212 When the petitioners
appealed the EPA’s denial to the D.C. Circuit, twelve states intervened
in support of the petitioners.213 After the appellate court denied the
petition for review, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a fivefour opinion, reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the EPA
has authority under the CAA to regulate GHG emissions from new
motor vehicles and that it had failed to provide reasons for its denial
consistent with the statutory text.214
Before reaching the merits, however, the Court had to find that one of
the petitioners had standing. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
concluded that Massachusetts had standing. In reaching this conclusion,
the fact that Massachusetts is a state appeared to carry particular weight.
Justice Stevens emphasized the “considerable relevance” of
Massachusetts’s status as a “sovereign State,” rather than a private
litigant, and argued that the Court had long treated states differently
(from other litigants) in analyzing Article III jurisdiction.215 Because
Congress had empowered individuals, including states, to challenge the
denial of EPA’s rulemaking petition and because Massachusetts sought
to protect “its quasi-sovereign interests,” Justice Stevens stressed that it
was “entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”216
For the proposition that states are not “normal litigants,” Justice
Stevens cited Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. and its language
regarding quasi-sovereign interests “in all the earth and air within [a
state’s] domain.”217 Because GHG emissions threatened Massachusetts’s
coastal land with rising sea levels, it bears some resemblance to the
interstate public nuisance cases, particularly a case (like Tennessee
Copper) involving out-of-state emissions that cause in-state air
pollution. But Justice Stevens did not depend on this analogy to justify
state standing. Nor could he. Massachusetts was not an interstate public
nuisance case. The state sought regulatory action on the part of the
federal government, not a judicial injunction against an out-of-state
212. Id. at 511.
213. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120). The American Samoa
Government and three U.S. cities also intervened. Id.
214. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532, 535.
215. Id. at 518.
216. Id. at 520.
217. Id. at 518–19.
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nuisance.
Interstate air pollution today is extensively regulated under the CAA,
a complex federal statute that contemplates an extensive implementation
role for state agencies.218 States have some latitude to enact more
stringent standards and to decide how to achieve federal air quality
standards, but in some areas (for example, vehicle emissions), federal
law preempts state action.219 To ensure the reduction of GHG emissions
from vehicles, Massachusetts needed the federal government to regulate.
Given that the intervenor states exercised regulatory authority over
emissions in a cooperative relationship with the federal government,
they more closely resembled the position of Puerto Rico in Puerto Rico
v. Alfred Snapp & Son than Georgia in Tennessee Copper. That is, like
Puerto Rico’s efforts to secure the benefits of federal employment law,
they sought to secure the benefits of federal environmental law for their
citizens. Not surprisingly, Justice Stevens cited Puerto Rico for the
proposition that a parens patriae suit may be appropriate in cases where
a state would exercise its police powers but cannot because they are
preempted by the federal government.220 According to the Court, in
addition to its interest in “all the earth and air within its domain,”
Massachusetts also had a “quasi-sovereign” interest in enforcement of
federal law when it preempts state authority.221 The quasi-sovereignty
contemplated by the Court in Massachusetts therefore refers (at least in
part) to the subordinate status of states to the federal government under
the Constitution, and it describes how states exercise a different kind of
sovereignty today given the reach of the modern federal administrative
state.222
Justice Brennan’s approach in Puerto Rico is therefore apropos.
Following his approach, we could say that Massachusetts had a
sovereign interest in enforcing the CAA because the EPA’s inaction
hindered its ability to carry out its obligations under the CAA—
obligations that the state assumed as part of its “sovereign
responsibility” to its citizens.223 If we take this approach, we no longer
218. See, e.g., CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012) (providing for state implementation plans).
219. See id. § 209(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (preempting state standards absent a federal waiver).
220. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519.
221. Id.
222. Justice Stevens echoed the historical rationale for the Court’s exercise of its original
jurisdiction, noting that states relinquished sovereign powers of force and diplomacy in interstate
relations when they entered the federal union. Id. He then added the surrender of state regulatory
power over in-state vehicle emissions in light of federal preemption. Id.
223. Cf. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 611 n.1 (1982)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
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need the concept of quasi-sovereignty. In fact, the use of the concept
only causes confusion and invites dissent. Indeed, writing in dissent in
Massachusetts, Chief Justice Roberts identified a potential limitation of
quasi-sovereignty and its association with the parens patriae suit: if a
state as parens patriae is suing on behalf of its citizens, it must
necessarily show that its citizens have suffered or will suffer some
injury.224 After all, a state suing in a representative capacity is suing first
and foremost to vindicate the interests of its citizens.
In other words, to base state standing on quasi-sovereignty implies
that a state is seeking access to federal court to vindicate something less
or other than its own sovereignty, or right to govern. But in cases
involving cooperative administrative schemes like the one in
Massachusetts, the state seeks to vindicate its own sovereignty interests
by challenging federal action (or inaction).225 The regulatory regime
under the CAA includes an implementation role for state governments;
indeed, the federal government could not implement the administrative
scheme without state cooperation. When states agree to undertake these
responsibilities, they do so as sovereign governments seeking to further
the general welfare of their citizens.

224. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 538 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“Just as an association suing on
behalf of its members must show not only that it represents the members but that at least one
satisfies Article III requirements, so too a State asserting quasi-sovereign interests as parens patriae
must still show that its citizens satisfy Article III.”). The doctrinal basis for state standing in true
parens patriae cases is unclear, partly because the Court has failed to distinguish parens patriae
cases from cases involving governance interests. Some precedent supports Chief Justice Roberts’s
analogy of state representative standing to associational standing. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977) (holding that a state agency representing the state
apple industry had standing to sue on behalf of the industry). Like the members of the state agency
in Hunt, a state attorney general who brings a parens patriae suit is elected and paid by the state’s
citizens. Id. at 344–45. In addition, in many parens patriae cases (e.g., those involving violations of
consumer protection laws), the state attorney general can allege a “financial nexus” between state
interests and the collective injuries of its citizens (an indicium of associational standing that
resembles a quasi-sovereign interest). Id. at 345. Although space constraints prevent further
treatment of state parens patriae standing in this Article, the topic needs more scholarly and judicial
development.
225. Other commentators have interpreted Massachusetts v. EPA to support state standing based
on the state’s sovereign interests in regulating or governing in certain situations. See, e.g., Jonathan
Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1073 (2010) (arguing that “states
ought to have greater solicitude to pursue . . . challenges [to federal inaction] where the federal
government has also preempted the states’ freedom to regulate”); Tyler Welti, Note, Massachusetts
v. EPA’s Regulatory Interest Theory: A Victory for the Climate, Not Public Law Plaintiffs, 94 VA.
L. REV. 1751, 1779 (2008) (arguing that a “state can vindicate public interests where federal
inaction (that may amount to an abuse of statutory discretion) impinges on the state’s ability to
regulate harms that threaten concrete injury such as coastal erosion”).
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LITIGATING GOVERNANCE INTERESTS IN AN ERA OF
SHARED GOVERNANCE

Puerto Rico and Massachusetts illustrate the problems in applying old
doctrines of state standing to litigation of governance interests in the
modern administrative state. Because states cannot govern in many areas
without confronting federal administrative law, they should be able to
challenge federal laws and actions that are part of administrative regimes
that contemplate an implementation role for the states. As the historical
discussion in Part I demonstrates, this approach follows easily from
previous cases involving the litigation of sovereignty interests. States
have historically litigated sovereignty, or governance, interests,
though—as Puerto Rico and Massachusetts demonstrate—the modern
administrative state has changed the kind of governance interests that
states seek to litigate. While early cases primarily addressed interstate
conflict, contemporary cases frequently involve state-federal conflict
arising out of regulatory regimes that contemplate both federal and state
participation.
Typically, Congress enlists state assistance in administrative
government in one of two ways: it either encourages state participation
by offering federal funds in exchange for state cooperation (as it did in
the federal employment service at issue in Puerto Rico) or conditions
non-preemption of state implementation and enforcement authority on a
state’s agreement to exercise this authority consistent with federal law
(as it did under the CAA at issue in Massachusetts). This kind of
“cooperative” federalism, as it is traditionally called, is pervasive. Most
major antipollution statutes, such as the CAA and the Clean Water Act,
contemplate substantial state participation, as do other health and safety
laws. States also agree to implement scores of federal standards in return
for federal funding in critical areas such as education and health care.
When states challenge federal actions (or inaction) under these
administrative schemes, they are playing the role of a sovereign state in
a post-sovereignty world. That is, they are seeking to vindicate their
interest in shared governance, the ideal at the heart of cooperative
federalism. Having agreed to play an administrative role, they have a
direct interest in shaping the policies and actions of the federal agencies
charged with ultimate authority under an administrative scheme. Having
surrendered lawmaking authority, states have a clear interest—as
separately constituted governments—in the implementation of federal
law. Moreover, as Seth Davis has argued, given the overlapping nature
of
modern
federal-state
regulatory
authority,
“permitting
intergovernmental litigation over institutional interests may be necessary
to achieve the competitive checks and balances the Framers envisioned
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would follow from a world of dual sovereignty.”226 In other words, state
challenges to federal authority in court “may substitute for the structural
check of state autonomy that passed away with the death of dual
sovereignty.”227
States also have a direct interest in challenging federal power before
they agree to play the supporting role contemplated by a new federal
statute. In recent years, the Court has not questioned the standing of
states to challenge federal laws that seek state cooperation through
allegedly coercive means. For example, state standing to challenge the
conditioning of Medicaid funding on Medicaid expansion under the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) was not controversial.228 But federal courts
struggled when states sought to challenge the ACA’s individual mandate
as an impermissible exercise of federal power. Under a governance
approach to state standing, because the ACA contemplates an
implementation role for states,229 they have a direct interest in resolving
constitutional questions ex ante—before they invest time and resources
in complying with the new regime.
This Part makes the case for a governance approach by anticipating
potential objections and applying the approach to two recent cases. The
argument is simple: when states seek to challenge federal laws and
actions, they have Article III standing if the federal law at issue
contemplates a role for state governments in its implementation. Federal
funding conditioned on state assistance in implementing federal law is
enough, as is conditional preemption of state authority in a given area.
The implementation role need not be substantial, although states will not
likely challenge laws that have small impacts (e.g., a law that requires
very little regulatory change at the state level). The federal law must do
more than grant states civil and criminal enforcement authority (as some
consumer protection laws do);230 it must contemplate that states will
share in the day-to-day business of regulating by implementing federal
policy through state administrative mechanisms and institutions.
This approach is consistent with the historical litigation of governance
interests, as described in Part I, while recognizing the dramatically
different nature of those interests in the modern administrative state. In
addition to reflecting today’s regulatory reality, the governance approach
226. Davis, supra note 16, at 82–83.
227. Id. at 83.
228. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012).
230. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1042
(2012) (authorizing enforcement suits by state attorneys general and state regulators).
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is a better fit with current doctrine. To demonstrate this, the first part of
this Section discusses how the approach intersects with the modern
injury-in-fact approach to individual standing. The governance approach
to state standing does not replace the injury-in-fact inquiry; rather, it
simplifies the inquiry by clarifying what a state must show to establish
an Article III injury in cases challenging federal power. After
demonstrating how the governance approach can be reconciled with
current standing doctrine, the second part of this Section explains how
the governance approach can help illuminate other threshold questions,
such as whether the court has statutory jurisdiction and whether the state
plaintiff has a cause of action. The Article concludes with an application
of the approach to two recent cases: Virginia’s challenge to the ACA and
Texas’s recent challenge to executive action in the area of immigration.
A.

Harm to Governance Interests as Article III Injury

1.

The Three-Part Test for Individual Standing

In contemporary standing analyses, the Court routinely requires that a
plaintiff meet three requirements in order to establish Article III
standing.231 First, to show an “injury-in-fact,” a plaintiff must show “an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent.”232 Second, the plaintiff
must establish a causal connection; the alleged injury must be “fairly
traceable” to the defendant’s conduct.233 And third, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that a favorable court decision is “likely” to redress the
injury.234 Although this three-part test is a fairly recent doctrinal
development, it is now well established and almost always applied—
even to questions of state standing.
Of course, in many cases involving state governance interests, the
Court does not analyze state standing, presumably because the injury to
state sovereignty is obvious. When, for example, New York challenged a
federal law that required the state to either take title to hazardous waste
or pass legislation reflecting federal policies, the Court did not pause to
consider state standing before deciding the Tenth Amendment

231. The case often cited as support for a definitive three-step test is Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
232. Id. at 559.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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challenge.235 The injury (infringing on the state’s authority) was obvious.
It was also “caused” by the federal law and redressable by a Court
decision invalidating the law.
Why should cases like Massachusetts v. EPA be any different? If the
Court had grounded state standing in Massachusetts’s governance
interests, rather than treating the suit as a parens patriae suit, the
analysis would have been straightforward: Massachusetts suffered an
injury to its sovereignty (i.e., to a governance interest) because the EPA
failed to carry out its rulemaking responsibilities under the CAA. As a
state with delegated authority under the CAA, it had a “concrete” and
legally protected interest in the implementation (and therefore the
prerequisite federal rulemaking) of the Act. Once the injury is clear, the
other requirements are easily met. The state’s inability to implement
emissions standards required by the Act was caused by the EPA and
redressable by a court decision.
But because the Court essentially treated Massachusetts as a parens
patriae case, the injuries at issue were injuries to Massachusetts’s
citizens, specifically, citizens with property affected by rising sea levels.
To avoid aggregating the injuries of individual citizens,236 however, the
Court focused on the proprietary injury to Massachusetts as a
landowner.237 It then had to grapple with the tenuous causal link between
coastal erosion of Massachusetts’s land and the EPA’s failure to regulate
new vehicle GHG emissions and the even more tenuous argument that
emissions standards would redress Massachusetts’s injury.238 Chief
Justice Roberts pointedly outlined all these weaknesses in his dissenting
opinion.239
This confusion is avoidable. If we understand state standing to
challenge federal administrative action and authority as grounded in a
state’s interest in governing, the injury is to the state as a sovereign
government, not the state as property owner or parens patriae. By
refusing to issue emissions standards, the federal government hindered
the states’ sovereign responsibility to implement laws that protect the
public health and welfare. As the Court’s precedents make clear, a
state’s constitutional sovereignty gives rise to a duty to be responsive
235. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
236. The Court did not say it was avoiding this analysis, but it is a reasonable assumption. Under
the Court’s parens patriae precedent, it is not clear how many citizens must be injured and whether
the extent of their injuries matters.
237. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522–23 (2007).
238. Id. at 523–26.
239. Id. at 540–46.
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and accountable to its electorate.240 In the contemporary administrative
state, the idea of sovereignty would mean very little if a state lacked
standing to challenge federal action (or inaction) under an administrative
scheme that enlists state cooperation. To be responsive and accountable
in cooperative administrative governance, states must therefore have a
mechanism for challenging federal executive action. Review in the
federal courts is the logical answer.
These basic principles also support state standing to challenge ex ante
some federal laws as unconstitutional exercises of federal power. The
Court has already treated state standing in Tenth Amendment cases like
New York v. United States as unremarkable.241 As discussed in Part I,
even in Massachusetts v. Mellon—the case often cited for the
proposition that sovereignty interests are nonjusticiable—the Court
arguably decided the state’s Tenth Amendment claim on the merits,
rather than on what courts would understand to be jurisdictional grounds
today.242 In cases involving Congress’s exercise of its Spending Power,
the line between the traditional Article III injury analysis and the merits
inquiry is impossible to draw because if a court concludes that a state
has not alleged an injury-in-fact, it is essentially concluding that the state
has not made a showing of impermissible coercion by the federal
government.
A Ninth Circuit opinion regarding state standing to challenge federal
funding of legal assistance providers illustrates this overlap in Spending
Clause cases.243 Oregon sued the Legal Services Corporation (LSC),
alleging that regulatory restrictions on the use of LSC funds violated the
Tenth Amendment by infringing on the state’s power to regulate law
practice and legal services programs.244 The Ninth Circuit held that
Oregon lacked standing to sue because “there [was] no burden or injury
placed on Oregon.”245 Private organizations, the legal service providers,
were the recipients of the federal funds.246 Consequently, “[t]he core of
the dispute [was] whether Oregon should have the ability to control the
conditions surrounding a voluntary grant of federal funds to specifically
240. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (“Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than
compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; state
officials remain accountable to the people.”).
241. See id.
242. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923).
243. Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2009).
244. Id. at 967.
245. Id. at 973.
246. Id.
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delineated private institutions.”247 The Court concluded that Oregon
lacked a “right, express or reserved” to control these conditions and
therefore lacked “a judicially cognizable injury.”248 Like the Court in
Mellon, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion is essentially one on the merits:
Oregon failed to state a Tenth Amendment claim of impermissible
coercion.
A governance approach to state standing would simplify these cases.
To determine whether states alleging an injury to their governance
interests have shown an injury-in-fact, courts would ask whether the
federal funding scheme contemplates an implementation role for states.
In the Oregon case, the answer would be no. Although Oregon may not
pass laws that conflict with federal policy if it wishes legal service
providers to receive federal funding, this funding does not depend on
whether the state participates in the implementation of federal policies.
Given the supremacy of federal law, states must often refrain from
regulating or regulate in a manner consistent with federal law. This
tension is not enough for state standing based on a governance interest.
Moreover, the fact that private organizations, rather than state entities,
receive the federal funding should not automatically disqualify states
under Article III. The critical inquiry is whether the federal law
encourages states to aid in its implementation. If it does, states should
have standing to litigate whether Congress exceeded its constitutional
authority.
The requirement that a state show that the federal law underlying its
challenge contemplates a governance role for states ensures that a true
Article III case or controversy is before the federal court. When a federal
law provides mechanisms for state cooperation, both the federal and
state governments have an “actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the
outcome,” which ensures that judicial decisions are based on concrete
interests litigated by adversaries.249 Indeed, as Massachusetts v. EPA
illustrates, state-federal conflicts under cooperative regulatory regimes
raise concrete, particular questions about the concurrent and overlapping
authority of state and federal governments. The fact that the framers

247. Id. at 974.
248. Id.
249. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Language regarding concrete interests and
adversarial posture harkens back to the canonical case of Baker v. Carr, requiring that parties show
a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.” 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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could not have anticipated the federalism of today cannot mean that the
intergovernmental conflicts generated by today’s federalism are not
Article III cases or controversies.
2.

The Bar on Litigating the Generalized Interest in the Proper
Administration of Laws

In contemporary standing cases, the Court has grappled with the
extent to which Article III permits individual suits based on generalized
grievances, that is, grievances widely shared by the general public. At
times, the Court has treated this as a prudential, rather than a
constitutional, limitation on Article III standing, suggesting it need not
bar the suit.250 In recent cases, the Court has made clear that, as long as
an individual meets the injury-in-fact requirement, constitutional
standing should not be limited by the fact that many others share the
plaintiff’s injury.251 Indeed, the injuries caused by climate change (and
other environmental harms) are almost always widely shared, but the
Court has accepted that they fall within Article III’s case or controversy
requirement.252
The Court has continued, however, to reject one kind of suit based on
a generalized grievance: a suit by a private individual based on the
generalized grievance in the executive’s administration of the laws.253 In
fact, in a recent decision, the Court emphasized that Article III does not
permit “suits ‘claiming only harm to [the plaintiff’s] and every citizen’s
interest in proper administration of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it
does the public at large.’”254 Historically, individuals sought to challenge
federal laws and actions on the basis of their standing as taxpayers; they
alleged injury to their interest in proper application of laws and
expenditures of public funds.255 The Court routinely dismissed such
suits, concerned that they would render Article III’s case or controversy

250. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982) (treating “generalized grievances” as a prudential consideration).
251. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (explaining that a generalized, or widely shared,
harm may satisfy Article III’s injury requirement if it is concrete rather than abstract and noting, as
examples, mass torts and voting rights injuries).
252. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (discussing harms resulting from
climate change).
253. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574 (1992).
254. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387
n.3 (2014) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74).
255. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 574–76 (discussing cases).
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requirement meaningless and threaten the constitutional separation of
powers among the three branches.256
The Court has elaborated on the separation-of-powers concern in
cases brought by states and individuals under “citizen-suit”
provisions.257 In these types of cases, Congress has explicitly authorized
suits by private individuals for particular violations of federal law.258
Many major environmental laws have such provisions, which are
designed to further their enforcement (often by nongovernmental
organizations suing on behalf of their members).259 And the
Administrative Procedure Act also authorizes individual suits to
challenge final federal agency actions when specific statutes do not
cover such actions.260 But as Justice Scalia has emphasized, Congress
cannot constitutionally confer on private individuals an individual right
to sue to enforce public rights:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public
interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an
‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress
to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s
most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.’261
In short, statutory authorization to sue is not enough without individual

256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–
77. Justice Scalia, in particular, has understood Article III standing in terms of separation of powers.
See, e.g., Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2695
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Article III standing is grounded in the separation of
powers). Historical accounts of the injury requirement suggest that it is grounded in Justice
Frankfurter’s attempt to limit judicial review of New Deal legislation, rather than in constitutional
history and precedent. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 462 (1996) (arguing that Justice Frankfurter’s
limits on the judicial power—to traditional private suits for common law injuries—ignored
historical English practice and founding-era understandings).
258. See cases cited supra note 257; Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV.
459 (2008) (examining how standing doctrine purports to serve various separation-of-powers
“functions” and arguing that the Court’s modern standing doctrine does not further these functions).
259. See, e.g., CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2012) (providing a right of action to sue
governmental actors and private individuals for violations of act); Clean Water Act (CWA)
§ 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012) (providing a right of action to sue private and governmental
actors for violations of the act). As is frequently the case, these provisions also authorize suits by
states by defining the “person” or “citizen” who may sue to include governmental entities. See CAA
§ 302(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (defining “person”); CWA § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (defining
“citizen”).
260. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012).
261. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
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injury.262
But this limitation on citizen suits to vindicate public interests makes
little sense applied to the states. As Richard Fallon has recently argued,
the “Court should make explicit that in some contexts, the standing
requirements that apply to private parties do not extend to the
government and its officials, and that in other cases the same formally
articulated demands require adjustments in light of the government’s
special status and role.”263 Unlike individuals, states are obligated to
represent their electorates’ interests. When they challenge federal action
or law that contemplates a governance role for states, they are not suing
based on a generalized grievance, but are instead seeking to vindicate
their concrete interests in governing—either as separate regulatory
entities or as cooperative agencies under a federal administrative
scheme. If the administrative scheme contemplates a governance role for
states in its implementation, states as regulatory participants in the
scheme have an interest that individual litigants do not share.
Moreover, assuming that federal law provides a cause of action, state
suits seeking to resolve questions of executive power do not present the
same separation-of-powers problems.264 This is so even if a state suit
challenging federal executive action is somewhat analogous to suits
between federal agencies or officials. Though examples of such cases in
the Supreme Court are rare,265 the Court has not explicitly said that they
violate the constitutional separation of powers.266 In fact, the Court has
262. As Aziz Huq has argued, the Court’s current practice of allowing individuals to sue to
vindicate structural constitutional rights, such as federalism, is in tension with the notion that
individuals may not enforce public rights. Huq, supra note 116, at 1473. States, he argues, are the
parties that benefit directly and primarily from constitutional principles of federalism. Id.
263. Fallon, supra note 8, at 1109; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“As
Government programs and policies become more complex and farreaching, we must be sensitive to
the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law
tradition.”).
264. While still a circuit judge, Justice Scalia noted that state parens-patriae suits challenging
federal actions do not necessarily raise separation of powers concerns provided Congress has
authorized states to sue. See Md. People’s Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
265. See, e.g., United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974); see also Joseph W. Mead, Interagency Litigation and Article III, 47 GA. L. REV. 1217,
1238–42 (2013) (detailing history of intergovernmental litigation in the Supreme Court).
266. See Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue
Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 915 (1991) (arguing that under the model of the “unitary
executive,” judicial resolution of interagency disputes would violate the separation of powers, but
that the unitary executive model is empirically and theoretically false). In a recent case, however,
Justice Scalia unequivocally expressed the view that intergovernmental litigation of political
authority falls outside Article III. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, __ U.S.
__, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2694 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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indicated that Congress may authorize intergovernmental litigation
based on conflicting regulatory interests without violating Article III. 267
Although the Court has emphasized that it would be “inappropriate” for
it to routinely decide “intrabranch and intraagency policy disputes,” it
has acknowledged that Congress could in some circumstances authorize
intragovernmental litigation consistent with Article III. 268 If it does not
violate Article III to authorize litigation within the executive branch, it
surely does not violate Article III to authorize litigation between the
states and the federal government—even if the states are cooperating
with the executive in implementing federal law.269
In the end, the notion that states should be able to litigate “public”
interests, though private parties may not, should be unremarkable.
Although the Court’s “special solicitude” for states in Massachusetts v.
EPA may appear exceptional, the history of state standing demonstrates
that they often are treated differently and for good reasons.270 Like the
federal government, state governments have interests different from
private litigants. Inherent in any concept of modern sovereignty is the
obligation to further the generalized interest in the proper administration
of the law. Indeed, a government’s historical standing to enforce its own
criminal and civil laws in its own courts is premised on this very idea.271
Moreover, the federal government’s standing to challenge state laws on
preemption grounds is apparently unremarkable. In 2012, the Court
decided whether federal law preempted a set of new immigration laws in
Arizona and did so without commenting on the federal government’s
267. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,
514 U.S. 122, 133 (1995).
268. Id. at 129, 133.
269. This is true, of course, only if Congress and the President can constitutionally delegate
authority to implement and enforce federal laws to state governments. Cooperative administrative
schemes provide for federal oversight and are likely constitutional. Outright delegation of
enforcement authority may, however, raise issues.
270. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986) (noting that, unlike a private party, a
“[s]tate clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”);
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (holding that private citizen lacked standing to defend
constitutionality of state statute because “only the State has . . . [a] ‘direct stake’ . . . in defending
the standards embodied in [its legal] code”); see also Davis, supra note 16, at 61–62 (arguing that
state agencies implementing federal administrative schemes have special expertise and interests that
support implied rights of action to enforce federal law when private litigants may not have similar
rights of action); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 73 (2011) (noting that “it makes sense to conclude that special protections for the states must
develop in the administrative realm if federalism is to have continuing relevance in the world of
national administrative governance that increasingly dominates today”).
271. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293,
299–300 (2005); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24, at 422.
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Article III standing.272 If the federal government has standing based on
its interest in the proper administration of laws, the states should as well.
B.

Finding the Appropriate Box: Separating State Standing from
Other Threshold Questions

In addition to bringing coherence to the doctrine of state standing to
challenge federal law, the governance approach would ensure that other
threshold questions are resolved separately. Questions regarding whether
a federal court has statutory subject matter jurisdiction and whether a
state has a cause of action under federal law are often difficult to resolve.
A complicated standing analysis that treats states like private parties
increases the likelihood that a court will overlook these important
questions or subsume them within the standing analysis. These
distinctions are important because, unlike questions of Article III
standing, questions regarding statutory jurisdiction and federal causes of
action require courts to give effect to Congress’s intent. In other words,
these are questions ideally resolved via the political process, whereas
questions regarding standing are questions of constitutional
interpretation ideally resolved by courts. Article III standing is the
constitutional minimum, but Congress may generally expand or contract
states’ access to the courts by passing appropriate legislation. Although a
thorough examination of these doctrinal areas is beyond the scope of this
Article, the following discussion provides a basic overview of how they
differ from the standing analysis and raises questions for further
scholarly inquiry.
1.

Statutory Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

A state that has Article III standing to sue the federal government
based on a governance interest will also have to assert a statutory basis
for the federal court’s jurisdiction. Because states are not citizens for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, if they are not seeking to invoke the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, they must bring suit in a federal
district court or appellate court pursuant to a congressional grant of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Often the basis for such jurisdiction

272. Arizona v. United States, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); see also Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 117 n.1 (1970) (noting that both states and the federal government sought to invoke
the Court’s original jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of conflicting state and federal laws
governing voting rights); Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539 (1958)
(holding that declaratory judgment action brought by the federal government against a state entity
was justiciable under Article III).
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will be in the district courts pursuant to their general federal question
jurisdiction.273 Congress is free, of course, to expand or limit this
jurisdiction in specific statutes. Some federal administrative schemes
contain their own jurisdictional provisions. States must, for example,
seek review of EPA actions that have a “nationwide scope or effect”
under the Clean Air Act only in the D.C. Circuit.274
When a state relies on the general grant of federal jurisdiction in 28
U.S.C. § 1331, jurisdiction will depend on whether the case “arises
under” the Constitution or other federal law (namely statutes and federal
common law).275 Although § 1331’s language closely tracks the
jurisdictional language in Article III,276 the Supreme Court has
interpreted the statutory grant differently and much more narrowly than
the constitutional grant.277 While the Constitution may permit federal
jurisdiction over cases that simply present federal issues, cases generally
“arise under” § 1331 only when federal law provides a cause of action
that appears on the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.278 In challenges to
administrative action, such as the one in Massachusetts v. EPA, states
typically bring suit under a statutory provision authorizing individual
state and citizen suits.279 In these cases, whether federal law clearly
provides a cause of action is a question of statutory interpretation.
But when states seek a declaration that federal law is unconstitutional
(and that state law or authority is therefore not preempted), they may
face an additional jurisdictional obstacle. Although federal statutory law
provides a remedy (the declaratory judgment), the Court has interpreted
the relevant statute to provide only a remedy.280 That is, it does not
273. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
274. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7607(b)(1) (2012).
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
276. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in
law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States . . . .”).
277. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2.1 (6th ed. 2012)
(providing an overview of the differences in Supreme Court interpretations of constitutional and
statutory grants of federal question jurisdiction).
278. This generalization regarding federal question jurisdiction oversimplifies what is a
complicated and not entirely coherent doctrinal area of law. But because many of the complications
arise when a plaintiff files a state law cause of action, they are not relevant to state suits challenging
federal authority, which are clearly grounded in federal law. For a more detailed overview, see id.
§ 5.2.
279. See cases cited supra note 259.
280. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (“Congress [in the
Declaratory Judgment Act] enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not
extend their jurisdiction.”).
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confer statutory jurisdiction on a federal court; a party seeking a
declaratory judgment must establish a separate basis for jurisdiction.
When the basis for jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a court must decide
whether federal law creates the cause of action, raising the difficult
question of whether a state has a federal “right” to sue to invalidate
federal laws under the Constitution.281
The language of the Declaratory Judgment Act arguably ties the
existence of a federal right to sue to the existence of an Article III “case
or controversy.” With some exceptions, the Federal Act authorizes
federal courts to grant declaratory relief “[i]n a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction,” even when other relief is
available.282 Courts have therefore analyzed the appropriateness of
declaratory relief in constitutional litigation in Article III terms and
exercised caution when issues appear hypothetical or abstract.283 But
despite the cautionary language in some cases, the federal courts have
exercised jurisdiction over a number of suits seeking declarations
regarding the validity of state and federal laws.284 Moreover, the federal
courts have exercised jurisdiction over state-federal litigation involving
the constitutional distribution of governmental power.285 As discussed
above, states have sought declaratory judgments that federal law is
impermissibly coercive in violation of the Tenth Amendment.286
Nevertheless, some Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Court
may interpret § 1331 narrowly in a state suit seeking only a declaration
that a federal law regulating individuals does not preempt state law.287 In

281. See id. at 671–72.
282. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
283. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (describing a “justiciable
controversy” under the Declaratory Judgment Act as “definite and concrete,” as opposed to
“hypothetical or abstract”).
284. See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2763
(3d ed. 2015) (summarizing and citing federal suits for declaratory judgments involving public law).
285. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 752 (1982) (state suit to declare certain federal
laws unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment).
286. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992) (state suit to declare certain
federal laws unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause). When the
United States is a plaintiff, statutory subject-matter jurisdiction is arguably aided by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1345, which provides that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions,
suits or proceedings commenced by the United States.”
287. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983);
see also Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost That Slayed the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 55, 65 (2012)
(arguing that a federal court does not have statutory subject-matter jurisdiction when a state sues to
declare federal law unconstitutional unless either party could have brought a nondeclaratory action
against the other party).
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1983, in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust,288 the Court suggested that federal courts should decline to
exercise jurisdiction over such a suit unless Congress specifically
authorizes it.289 In doing so, it noted that states do not suffer prejudice
because preemption issues may be litigated when individuals subject to
federal law sue for injunctive relief, and states may enforce their laws in
their own courts where they may also raise preemption questions.290
Franchise Tax Board is distinguishable in important respects from
state challenges to federal power based on governance interests. First, it
was originally brought by a state entity in state court pursuant to state
law.291 The question of federal jurisdiction was prompted only by the
defendant’s removal of the case to federal court on the basis of a federal
preemption defense.292 The Court’s reasoning and holding were
therefore informed by principles of comity.293 Second, with the
expansion of the federal administrative state, the need for uniform, ex
ante resolution of state-federal conflicts has arguably grown, making the
piecemeal resolution of these issues in injunctive suits by individuals
less desirable.294 However these jurisdictional questions are resolved, the
critical point is that they need resolution, but are too often obscured by
convoluted and unnecessary analyses of Article III standing. The
governance approach to state standing would help concentrate judicial
analysis where it is needed most.
2.

Federal Causes of Action

Although the Court often says that whether a federal cause of action
exists is not a question of jurisdiction, the two questions often overlap,
as the discussion above makes clear. Moreover, particularly in
administrative law, certain issues can be jurisdictional in some cases but
288. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
289. Id. at 21–22.
290. Id. at 21.
291. Id. at 5–6.
292. Id. at 6.
293. See id. at 21 n.22 (“[I]t is perhaps appropriate to note that considerations of comity make us
reluctant to snatch cases which a State has brought from the courts of that State, unless some clear
rule demands it.”). A plaintiff’s request for a declaration that federal law does not preempt state law
clearly appears to arise under federal law. Courts struggle, however, because preemption claims are
traditionally raised as defenses, rather than as part of the original complaint. See Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (noting that “[f]ederal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal
defense to the plaintiff’s suit”).
294. The import of this case is also unclear in light of subsequent cases. See Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
481 U.S. at 64 (treating Franchise Tax Board as a case about removal jurisdiction).
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not in others. For example, if a state seeks review under a specific
statutory authorization to sue, like the one in the Clean Air Act, the
relevant statutory provision may contain jurisdictional elements.295
When, however, a state seeks review of an agency action under the
general review provisions in the Administrative Procedure Act, subjectmatter jurisdiction must be grounded elsewhere (typically in § 1331’s
general grant of federal question jurisdiction).296 But even when the
questions overlap, courts should take care to analyze them separately. As
the above discussion of the Declaratory Judgment Act demonstrates, the
availability of a federal remedy does not necessarily mean a federal
court has jurisdiction.297 Similarly, when a federal court has jurisdiction
over an arguable cause of action “arising under” federal law, it may
nevertheless dismiss the case for failure to state a valid claim.
When a state seeks to challenge federal law or action, it must allege a
valid cause of action under federal law. State suits against the federal
government based on governance interests generally take one of two
forms: a suit seeking to invalidate federal law as a violation of the
Constitution (e.g., as outside Congress’s enumerated powers or in
contravention of the Tenth Amendment) or a suit challenging federal
agency action (or inaction) pursuant to a statutory provision specifically
authorizing individual suits for violations of federal law.
In the first kind of case (state actions challenging federal authority
under the Constitution), a court must ask whether the right of action
arises under the Constitution or elsewhere. Recently, in Armstrong v.
Exceptional Child Center Inc.,298 the Court considered whether an
implied right of action exists under the Supremacy Clause.299 In deciding
that such a right does not exist, the Supreme Court made clear that
plaintiffs could nevertheless seek to enjoin unconstitutional
governmental action because the “ability to enjoin unconstitutional
actions by state and federal officers” is an inherent power of federal
courts of equity.300 The Court was unanimous on this point; the four
295. See, e.g., Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 686 F.3d 803, 808 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (treating lack of final agency decision as jurisdictional under CAA’s judicial review
provision).
296. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977) (holding that the APA’s review provisions
do not grant subject-matter jurisdiction).
297. See supra Section III.B.1.
298. __U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1384; see also Preis, supra note 82 (arguing that federal courts have historical power
in constitutional cases to imply injunctive relief); John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV.
989, 1022 (2008) (arguing that Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), involved a traditional

10 - Roesler.docx (Do Not Delete)

692

6/3/2016 12:49 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:637

dissenting justices agreed that the power of “federal courts to enjoin
unconstitutional government action is not subject to serious dispute.”301
The Court’s decision in Armstrong suggests that a state seeking to enjoin
the enforcement of federal law need not identify a separate right under
the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal common law. Congress may,
of course, foreclose suits for injunctive relief for specific violations of
federal law.302
Whether Armstrong suggests that a cause of action for declaratory
relief is similarly within the federal courts’ equitable authority is not
clear. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the
Court “has thus long entertained suits in which a party seeks prospective
equitable protection from an injurious and preempted state law without
regard to whether the federal statute at issue itself provided a right to
bring an action.”303 In support of this proposition, she cited cases in
which plaintiffs sought declaratory relief.304 The precise origins and
nature of declaratory relief are somewhat contested, however.305 Given
that state suits to invalidate federal law under the Constitution involve
issues of governmental power likely to be litigated as injunctive suits in
equity, federal precedents arguably suggest that declaratory relief is
within a federal court’s equitable power and that, under the reasoning of
Armstrong, it is a remedy that does not require an implied constitutional
right of action.306

equitable remedy, the anti-suit injunction, and that this type of action arguably allows suits to
enforce constitutional provisions which do not alone create causes of action).
301. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1390 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
302. See, e.g., id. at 1385 (majority opinion) (holding that Medicaid statute precludes private
enforcement).
303. Id. at 1391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
304. Id. (citing, for example, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), in which plaintiff
sought declaration that state law was preempted by federal law).
305. Recognizing that the federal remedy is statutory, but also within the discretion of the court,
federal courts have often looked to the nature of the underlying issues in a case to determine
whether they would have presented actions in law or equity in the absence of a declaratory remedy.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Norman Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1972) (“A declaratory
judgment action cannot be termed as either inherently at law or in equity. When classification has
been required, courts have examined the basic nature of the issues involved to determine how they
would have arisen had Congress not enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act.”). In addition, the
Supreme Court has characterized a court’s resolution of such matters as “equitable in nature.”
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952).
306. As John Harrison has noted, traditional suits to enjoin future legal proceedings (in which a
plaintiff asserts a defense she would otherwise have in a legal action) resemble declaratory
judgment actions: “both are used by potential defendants to become plaintiffs and assert defenses
without waiting to be sued.” Harrison, supra note 300, at 1000. This, he argues, is not a historical
accident; the law professor who advocated forcefully for the adoption of declaratory judgment
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In the second kind of state challenge, when a state sues under a
federal statute, questions analyzed as part of the Article III standing
inquiry may be more appropriately characterized as questions regarding
whether the plaintiff has a right of action under federal law. For
example, in Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc.,307 the Supreme Court cautioned that a question often characterized
as part of the “prudential standing” analysis under Article III is more
appropriately analyzed as a matter of statutory interpretation.308 Courts
had analyzed, as a matter of prudential standing, whether a plaintiff who
sues under a federal statute falls within the “zone of interests” protected
by the statute.309 The Lexmark Court emphasized that the correct inquiry
is not one of standing, but “whether a legislatively conferred cause of
action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim”—a question that
requires judicial interpretation of the statute.310
Lexmark recognizes that statutory challenges sometimes involve
questions of statutory interpretation that are more appropriately resolved
as such rather than incorporated into the Article III standing analysis.
This may be particularly true in the kinds of cases brought by states
challenging federal administrative action or inaction as unlawful
exercises of authority. These cases are typically brought under statutory
provisions conferring procedural rights, such as the right to challenge a
final agency action regarding a rulemaking or petition for a rulemaking.
In these cases, plaintiffs must assert a procedural right of action under
the statute. Rather than analyzing whether the plaintiff has a procedural
right as a question of Article III injury, courts should analyze this as a
question of statutory interpretation. Under a governance approach to
state standing, this distinction would be clear. If a state challenges
federal action under an administrative statute that contemplates state
implementation, it will have standing to bring the suit. But this does not
mean that the federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction or that the
state has a cause of action.
To illustrate the distinction, consider current state litigation to
invalidate court-sanctioned settlement agreements between the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) and conservation groups. Midwestern states
are essentially asking a federal court to invalidate agreements in which

statutes “regarded them as an improved form of the suit to restrain legal proceedings.” Id.
307. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
308. Id. at 1386.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1387.
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the FWS agreed to specific timelines for deciding whether to list various
candidate species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).311 The
states argue that these agreements prevent the FWS from maintaining a
species’ classification as “warranted but precluded” by resource
limitations—a classification the agency may make in its discretion.312
They also note that they were not part of the settlement negotiations or
otherwise consulted and were thereby “deprived of an opportunity to
participate in shaping the substantive policy choices embedded in the
FWS’s settlements.”313
The ESA contemplates a shared governance role for states.314 In
shutting states out of the policymaking decisions adopted in the
settlements, states have arguably suffered an injury to their governance
interests and should therefore be able to establish Article III standing.315
The problem, however, is that states lack a cause of action. The states
essentially claim that the settlements violate the ESA because they
prevent the FWS from making a warranted-but-precluded finding for
species covered by the settlements.316 But as the D.C. Circuit has
recognized, the ESA does not require a warranted-but-precluded finding
and Congress did not provide plaintiffs with “a means to require
continued warranted-but-precluded findings.”317 The only right of action
under the ESA is an action challenging the agency’s final rule listing the
species.318 In short, the state plaintiffs do not have a cause of action.
Although courts sometimes couch this analysis in standing doctrine, it is
fundamentally a question of whether the statute provides a cause of
311. See Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma v. Dep’t of
Interior, No. 1:15-cv-00252-EGS (D.D.C. July 31, 2015).
312. Id. at 2.
313. Id. at 1.
314. ESA § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)–(d) (2012) (authorizing FWS to enter into cooperative
agreements with states that have “adequate and active [conservation] programs” and to provide
federal funding in conjunction with cooperative agreements).
315. Recently, the D.C. Circuit denied a petition for review of EPA’s proposed rules regulating
GHG emissions from power plants. In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Both private and state plaintiffs brought the suit. Id. at 334. The court correctly denied the petition
because EPA’s rules are not yet final. Id. at 333–34. But it also noted that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the settlement agreement establishing a timeline for regulation because they
were not injured by a procedural deadline. Id. at 336. Although the state plaintiffs clearly lack a
statutory right of action to challenge the settlements, their status as states should provide standing to
sue based on their shared governance role under the Clean Air Act.
316. Id.
317. In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litigation—MDL No. 2165, 704 F.3d 972,
978 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
318. Id. at 977.
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action.
C.

Applying the Governance Approach: Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius and Texas v. United States

In the contemporary administrative state, intergovernmental conflict
over regulatory authority is likely to increase. Although most statefederal regulatory partnerships do not require judicial resolution, the
large number of these partnerships ensures that some conflicts regarding
regulatory power will require adjudication. Application of an incoherent
and flawed doctrine of state standing only threatens to prolong conflict
and increase the costs of governing. The governance approach to state
standing serves a gatekeeping function; it grants Article III standing to
states with direct, concrete injuries to governance interests and denies it
to states alleging indirect, insubstantial injuries to other kinds of
interests.
Two recent controversies between states and the federal government
illustrate this dynamic and are the subject of this Section. In the first
case, a challenge by Virginia to the individual mandate under the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), the governance approach would confer
standing on the state plaintiff, though other threshold questions might
prevent the lawsuit.319 In the second case, a very recent challenge by
Texas and other states to a federal immigration policy, the governance
approach would not confer standing on the states.320 In both cases, the
governance approach reaches a result different from the federal court’s
resolution and does so through a much more streamlined, coherent
analytical framework than the federal courts currently use.
1.

Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius

After the ACA passed in 2010, Virginia passed a state law declaring,
among other things, that “[n]o resident of this Commonwealth . . . shall
be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance
coverage.”321 The state statute was a clear repudiation of the ACA’s
“individual mandate,” a provision requiring most individuals to purchase
health insurance coverage or pay a penalty.322 Virginia also sued the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, challenging

319.
320.
321.
322.

Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011).
Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015).
Virginia, 656 F.3d at 267 (quoting VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-3434.1:1 (2011)).
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (2012).
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the individual-mandate provision as an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.323 Virginia prevailed
in the lower federal court, but the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia
lacked Article III standing to sue.324
Virginia argued that it had standing based on injury to its sovereign
interest in creating and enforcing a legal code.325 Indeed, both parties
(and the courts) assumed that the state’s statutory declaration regarding
individual insurance coverage was central to the standing inquiry.
Virginia argued that its sovereign interest in passing laws gave it
standing to litigate the constitutionality of a federal law preempting state
law.326 The federal government argued that Virginia’s statute was merely
a declaratory attempt to nullify federal law and that its lawsuit was, in
reality, a parens patriae suit brought on behalf of its citizens seeking to
shield those citizens from the operation of federal law.327 The Supreme
Court has on more than one occasion rejected such a suit.328
Focusing on the state statute, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
“non-binding declaration does not create any genuine conflict with the
individual mandate, and thus creates no sovereign interest capable of
producing injury-in-fact.”329 Given that the Act was essentially
unenforceable, the court characterized Virginia’s “real interest” as an
interest in litigating a policy preference (against the individual mandate)
on behalf of individuals.330 This, of course, it could not do. The court
noted that a contrary ruling would permit a state to “acquire standing to
challenge any federal law merely by enacting a statute,” a result that
would allow “each state . . . [to] become a roving constitutional
watchdog of sorts.”331 Particularly because the challenged provision
applied only to individuals, the court did not think that the state-federal
conflict generated by Virginia’s declaratory statute was sufficient to
“assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
323. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 266.
324. Id. at 267.
325. Appellee’s Opening and Response Brief at 19–20, Virginia, 656 F.3d 253 (Nos. 11-1057,
11-1058).
326. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 268; see also Kenneth T. Cuccinelli et al., State Sovereign Standing:
Often Overlooked, But Not Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 89 (2012) (detailing Virginia’s arguments
for state standing based on sovereignty interests).
327. Brief for Appellant at 24–28, Virginia, 656 F.3d 253 (Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058).
328. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 485–86 (1923).
329. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 270.
330. Id. at 271.
331. Id. at 272.
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issues.”332
The court’s standing analysis is a reasonable application of the injuryin-fact requirement to a state statute. Surely state statutes purporting to
nullify federal law cannot open the federal courthouse doors to state
suits. But if Virginia had focused less on its declaratory statute and more
on the nature of the ACA and the governance role it contemplates for
states, perhaps the outcome would have been different. At the very least,
a governance approach to the issue would address the court’s concern
with opening the floodgates to state litigation of federal statutes. States
would have standing only in cases involving a federal administrative
scheme that contemplates an implementation role for states.333
The ACA contemplates a substantial role for states in its
implementation.334 Even if states may choose not to play any
implementation role (as five states have), Congress drafted the
regulatory scheme counting on the fact that at least some states will
cooperate with the federal government.335 And that is precisely what has
happened. Although many states have chosen to use the federally
facilitated marketplace, a significant subset of these states are running
various aspects of their marketplaces or continuing to conduct plan
management (review of plans for compliance with marketplace
standards).336 Well over half of all states have passed legislative or
regulatory measures designed to implement ACA market reforms.337
Indeed, because the field of private health insurance has historically
332. Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
333. State standing in cases like Virginia resembles third-party standing in that states have
standing based on an alleged injury to a governance interest, but are challenging the federal
government’s power to regulate individuals, who are not parties. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (allowing bartender to challenge a state law permitting the sale of 3.2% beer to women at
age eighteen, but barring sale to men until age twenty-one).
334. See Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the Constitution: How States Can
Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 275 (2013) (arguing that
ACA gives states broad regulatory flexibility and may even lead to expanded state authority over
private health insurance).
335. See Gluck, supra note 7, at 578 (noting that the states’ “leadership role” was critical to the
ACA’s passage).
336. KATIE KEITH & KEVIN W. LUCIA, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 10 (2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/
Fund%20Report/2014/Jan/1727_Keith_implementing_ACA_state_of_states.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SCT-XUVM]; see also, The Affordable Care Act’s Health Insurance
Marketplaces by Type, COMMONWEALTH FUND, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/interactivesand-data/maps-and-data/state-exchange-map [https://perma.cc/9BJT-MUEW] (last visited May 28,
2016) (showing thirteen states with state marketplaces and nineteen states with varying levels of
state-federal cooperation in 2015).
337. KEITH & LUCIA, supra note 336, at 14.
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been regulated by states,338 the ACA disrupts a great many state laws
and regulatory practices and replaces them with a state-federal, sharedgovernance model.
It is difficult to imagine a litigant with a more concrete interest in
litigating the constitutionality of the ACA than a state government
considering its regulatory options. Before investing resources in
regulatory reform, a state has a concrete interest in litigating the
boundaries of state-federal power. If the federal statute seeks to enlist
state cooperation in governance, the state has a direct interest in
resolving the constitutionality of the federal scheme before deciding
whether to cooperate. Should the federal scheme be struck down as
unconstitutional after a state agrees to cooperate, the state will incur
costs, including lost opportunity costs (that is, costs associated with the
time and resources the state could have devoted to other regulatory
matters).339
Standing based on a governance interest does not therefore turn on
whether a state enacts a conflicting law or regulation. It depends on the
nature of the federal statute. Because not every federal statute will seek
state participation in its implementation, this approach does not turn
states into “roving constitutional watchdog[s].”340 Moreover, because
states do not have unlimited resources, they are not likely to sue unless
the administrative scheme will have a substantial impact on state
regulatory institutions. In short, the approach does not open the
floodgates.341
That does not mean, of course, that suits like Virginia’s will proceed
to the merits. As discussed above, Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the Declaratory Judgment Act cast some doubt on whether a federal
court would have federal subject-matter jurisdiction over a state suit to
invalidate a federal law that applies only to individuals.342 Moreover,
even if statutory jurisdiction exists now, Congress could choose to limit
338. Id. at 9.
339. See Gluck, supra note 7, at 590 (noting that ACA “requires elaborate infrastructures to be
created and implemented at the state and local levels”).
340. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011).
341. Scholars have raised concerns that state standing to challenge federal power risks turning
courts into “councils of revision” pronouncing on abstract questions of state versus federal
authority. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 101, at 872. But under a governance approach to state
standing, a true controversy would exist; mere preemption of state law by federal law would be
insufficient.
342. See supra Section III.B.1; Walsh, supra note 287, at 65 (arguing that federal courts did not
have federal subject-matter jurisdiction over Virginia’s declaratory judgment suit because neither
party could have brought a nondeclaratory action).
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it. It could, for example, divest the lower federal courts of jurisdiction
over state suits challenging a given statute—although its ability to do so
will be limited by states’ participation in the federal political process and
could raise constitutional concerns.343 A less controversial path would be
to limit the time period in which a state may challenge a new regulatory
regime, such as the ACA. The critical point is that the political process
should determine the states’ access to the federal courts, rather than an
overly narrow view of Article III standing. 344
2.

Texas v. United States

In 2014, twenty-six states, including Texas, asked a federal court to
enjoin a federal immigration policy known as “Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents,” or “DAPA.”345
The Secretary of Homeland Security established the policy by an
executive memorandum that contained guidelines for federal agencies to
consider when exercising their prosecutorial discretion to grant deferred
action for certain individuals.346 Deferred action does not grant a legal
status, but it does allow an individual to be “lawfully present in the
United States” for a period of time, which is subject to agency
discretion.347 The states challenged the Secretary’s memorandum as a
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Take Care
Clause of the Constitution.348
The district court held that Texas had standing to seek a preliminary
injunction based on the economic costs of issuing driver’s licenses to
individuals “lawfully present” as a result of DAPA deferred action.349 In
deciding whether to stay the district court’s preliminary injunction
343. Suits between a state and the federal government are within the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction. Congress has specified that the Court has original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction over
such suits. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). Although Congress may decide whether the United States
consents to be sued, Congress may violate the Constitution by eliminating all federal court
jurisdiction (including the Court’s original jurisdiction) if the federal government has consented
(e.g., under the APA) and a federal right of action exists. See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59
(1979) (questioning whether Congress could eliminate the Court’s original jurisdiction over
controversies between states and the federal government).
344. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (“State sovereign
interests . . . are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.”).
345. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015).
346. Id. at 744.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 743.
349. Id. at 746.
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pending appeal, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
court’s standing analysis.350 The two-judge majority reasoned that even
though Texas “could avoid financial injury by raising its application fees
to cover the full cost of issuing and administering a license,” it had
established an Article III injury because “Texas’s forced choice between
incurring costs and changing its fee structure is itself an injury.” 351 The
majority clearly characterized this injury as an injury to Texas’s
“sovereign interest” in creating and enforcing laws.352
Subsequently, in considering the government’s appeal of the
preliminary injunction, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit again agreed
that Texas had standing.353 The majority began its analysis by
emphasizing that the state plaintiffs were entitled to “special solicitude”
in the standing inquiry under Massachusetts v. EPA.354 This special
treatment was justified because the federal policy subjected the states to
“substantial pressure” to change their laws and the states’ surrender of
control over immigration matters to the federal government implicated
sovereignty interests.355 The appellate panel affirmed the district court’s
grant of a preliminary injunction,356 and the Supreme Court agreed to
review the case this term.357 Standing is one of the issues before the
Court.358
With this case, the Court has an opportunity to clarify precisely when
and why state plaintiffs are entitled to “special solicitude” for purposes
of Article III standing. In doing so, the Court should also make clear the
shortcomings of the traditional injury-in-fact analysis in state challenges
to federal law. Just as Virginia v. Sebelius illustrates how a traditional
injury-in-fact analysis can incorrectly bar state standing, Texas v. United
States illustrates how a traditional injury-in-fact analysis can incorrectly
grant state standing to challenge federal policy. As the federal
government has argued, the plaintiffs’ standing analysis arguably

350. Id. The panel ultimately denied the federal government’s motion to stay the district court’s
preliminary injunction of DAPA. Id. at 769.
351. Id. at 749.
352. Id.
353. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 162 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906
(2016).
354. Id. at 151.
355. Id. at 154–55.
356. Id. at 188.
357. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016).
358. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (No. 15-674), 2015 WL 7308179.
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supports state standing to challenge virtually any federal law or action.359
All a state would need to show is that it must either incur costs (however
small) or change its laws as a result of a federal policy. And the costs
need not be directly connected to the federal action challenged. But if
this were truly enough for state standing, states would have standing to
challenge virtually any federal law or policy based on indirect impacts to
the states’ economies. There would be no meaningful limit.
Application of the governance approach to state standing solves this
problem. The DAPA memorandum at issue in Texas was an exercise of
federal executive authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), a federal statute that does not contemplate an implementation
role for state governments.360 In fact, immigration statutes even limit
states’ enforcement authority.361 Because federal immigration law does
not contemplate shared governance through state implementation, states
do not have a governance interest that supports Article III standing. A
state could not therefore establish standing based on a sovereignty
interest.362
A governance-interest analysis simplifies the threshold question of
standing in a case like Texas v. United States and makes it less
susceptible to judicial manipulation. As one of the dissenting circuit
judges emphasized, governmental officials and state governments are
deeply divided over DAPA; fifteen states supported the federal
government’s position in the case.363 Judges have also used standing
doctrine to reach conflicting results regarding similar immigration
policies. A month before the first appellate decision in Texas, a different
panel of the Fifth Circuit held that the indirect economic impacts of a
similar deferred-action program were insufficient to support state
standing.364 Understanding state sovereignty in terms of governance
359. See Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 9, Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir.
2015) (No. 15-40238) (arguing that the majority’s approach would allow state standing anytime a
state changes its law to conform to federal law—for example, by adopting an IRS definition or a
health and safety standard).
360. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1107 (2012).
361. 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (limiting detention authority to “certain illegal aliens”).
362. Congress could attempt to give states standing by authorizing state challenges to federal
actions under the INA, but it is not clear that Congress could confer Article III standing on a state
simply by providing a statutory right of action. The Supreme Court’s recent analysis in Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins suggests that a statutory right of action would be insufficient without a “concrete and
particularized” injury. 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). The Court emphasized, however, that an injury
need not be tangible to be concrete. Id. at 1549. Injury to a state’s governance interest could
therefore satisfy the concreteness requirement.
363. Texas, 787 F.3d at 784 (Higginson, J., dissenting).
364. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir. 2015).
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interests easily resolves the standing inquiry and helps ensure that
political debates play out in the political branches of government.
CONCLUSION
We live in a world of shared governance, a world in which the
supremacy of federal law depends on state cooperation in its
implementation, and the efficacy of state regulation depends on federal
support and action. The federal administrative state has expanded in an
attempt to solve complex economic and social problems that traverse
state and even national boundaries. But particularly in the health, safety,
and environmental arenas, federal standards would mean very little in
the absence of state cooperation. Without the assistance of state
administrative agencies and mechanisms, the federal government would
be unable to implement these protections in every state or would
implement them in a way that fails to account for important local
differences. In this “post-sovereignty” world, we need a doctrine of state
standing that recognizes the interests of states as co-regulators under
some federal laws.
The governance approach to state standing recognizes this regulatory
reality. It allows states to challenge federal laws and actions when the
underlying federal law contemplates state assistance in its
implementation. When states share in the day-to-day business of
regulating by implementing federal policy, they have a concrete
governance interest in litigating the boundaries of state-federal authority
and in challenging federal actions that affect states as regulatory
partners. Massachusetts had such an interest in challenging the EPA’s
decision not to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. And
because the Affordable Care Act contemplates state implementation of
market reforms and exchanges, Virginia had a governance interest in
challenging the Act as an unconstitutional exercise of federal power.
When federal law preempts state law, state standing should not turn on
whether the state can allege a traditional injury-in-fact. Indeed, as Texas
v. United States demonstrates, a state can almost always show that
federal law has some effect on state laws or expenditures. But indirect
injuries should not be enough. The governance approach to state
standing would ensure that states have a direct interest in resolving
questions of intergovernmental authority. It would also help clarify state
standing doctrine, making it less susceptible to judicial manipulation and
facilitating the resolution of other threshold questions.

